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In recent years, the Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) has become
an integral component in the total force structure of the US Marine Corps
(USMC). With US military force reductions since 1992, the USMC has shifted
more war-fighting capability to the Reserve Forces (Brinkley, 1998).
Consequently, the USMC needs qualified recruits in order to fill Military
Occupational Specialties (MOSs) in each SMCR unit in order to meet operational
commitments. Additionally, it is essential the USMC fill undermanned MOSs
with new recruits to maintain force readiness.
The recruitment process for the Reserve Forces operates in a unique
environment. The military views the recruit as a full-time employee and recruits
along traditional lines (Cascio, 1991). However, potential recruits approach the
process from a different perspective. Recruits view Reserve Force enlistment as a
part-time job decision and follow a moonlighting model (Shishko and Rostker,
1976).
The USMC currently evaluates Reserve Force "health" by personnel end-
strength, but does not have a method to identify chronically short MOSs within
SMCR units. Numerous studies investigate the influence of demographic factors
and monetary educational benefits upon accession or retention, but only at the
national or regional level (Goldberg, Greenston & Andrews, 1984; Bock & Moore,
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1984; O'Donohue, 1988; Fugita & Lakhani, 1991; Asch & Dertouzos, 1994).
While applicable to general military service, the findings are not always applicable
to Reserve Force service.
The present study develops a methodology for determining chronically short
MOSs in Reporting Unit Codes (RUCs) within the SMCR. It finds numerous
MOS shortages across all RUCs without regard to geographic region. These
shortages are not confined to any MOS or family of MOSs.
Demographic factors that might account for MOS fill rates throughout the
country are considered by concentrating on those that might account for fill rates
within an entire region and which might differentiate one region from another.
After exploring five broad areas, the study fails to identify any significant factors.
RUCs are then grouped by state and after performing a similar analysis on the
same factors, the study finds state differences exist and are determined by
constructing a regression tree.
Finally, the study explores differences between personnel in a few selected
units; infantry weapons companies. The analysis reveals regional and unit
differences in several service-related and personal factors. Interestingly,
population characteristics are not consistent nationally among similar SMCR units.
In fact, some of the differences appear to be regional while others tend to remain at
the RUC level.
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The study finds that only one region, the Northeast, displays a strong
relationship between MOS fill rate and demographic factors. The rest of the
regions display trends only at the local level. The study also finds that wide
variation exits between RUCs and regions in almost every investigated personal
attribute. These results suggest the USMC should target the Montgomery GI Bill
(MGIB) Stipend at the MOS RUC level. As an incentive to change to or enlist
into a chronically short MOS, the MGIB will be beneficial for Region 2, North-
central, and isolated RUCs within the other regions. However, the USMC can
develop alternative recruitment incentives for RUCs where educational incentives






In recent years, the Reserve Forces have become integral components in the
United States military establishment (Cohen, 1998). Decreases in end-strength tend to
favor the use of the reserves, and Congress continues to support the reserves both in end-
strength and funding (Taylor, 1993). As a component of the Reserve Forces, the
Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) is an integral component in the total force
structure of the United States Marine Corps (USMC). With the reduction in force of the
American military establishment since 1992, the USMC continues to shift more and more
war-fighting capability into the Reserves (Brinkley, 1998). Therefore, recruitment to fill
the enlisted reserve ranks in order to maintain a force level of 40,000 Marines is of
primary concern (Cohen, 1998).
The USMC needs qualified reserve recruits in order to fill specific Military
Occupational Specialties (MOSs) which are no longer found in the active duty forces.
Additionally, certain operational capabilities have been significantly reduced making the
SMCR indispensable in order for the USMC to meet its operational commitments. This
thesis explores personnel shortfalls in MOSs and demographic factors that may cause
these shortages.
In 1996, Lieutenant General S. E. Ebbesen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, and the Honorable A. Bemis, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Manpower and Personnel, report to the Sixth
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation that the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB)
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continues to be an important recruiting and retention incentive. Additionally, the RAND
Corporation, a private research organization, conducted a series of studies confirming
that the MGIB continues to be one of the most important recruiting and retention
incentives for the reserve components (Ebbesen and Bemis, 1996). However, the studies
also find that the MGIB has, after adjustment for inflation, decreased student tuition
coverage from 45% 1986 to 33% in 1994. In light of this decrease in benefits, several
services have "Kicker" programs designed to augment the MGIB and increase the
amount of college costs covered in selected MOSs at specific reserve units up to an
additional supplement of $350.00 per month.
Manpower & Reserve Affairs (M&RA) for Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Marine
Corps (HQMC) recently received authorization to begin funding the MBIG Stipend, a
supplement to the MGIB, beginning in fiscal year 2000 (FY00). The stipend is
equivalent to the "Kicker" programs and will be used to increase recruitment in specific
MOS and reserve unit combinations. Qualification criteria are set forth in Marine
Administrative Notice (MARADMIN) 148/98. Major Weis, HQMC, M&RA for Reserve
Affairs, states that qualified recipients will receive not only the benefits of the MGIB but
an additional MGEB supplement each month (Weis, personal communication, October
1998). This stipend is designed as a recruitment tool to recruit qualified college-bound
applicants into chronically short MOSs. The service member may use the stipend in
conjunction with the MGIB in the pursuit of any program approved in Chapter 30 of 38
United States Code (Department of Defense Instruction 1322.17, 1991).
The USMC Reserve Forces are geographically scattered throughout the United
States in company- or battalion/ squadron-size units. Units are not necessarily
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geographically co-located with sister units or higher command elements. Each unit has a
distinctive reporting unit code (RUC) and a table of organization (T/O). The T/O closely
mirrors its active duty counterpart. Recruitment for the MOSs, which comprise the unit's
T/O, come from two areas: 1) active duty Marines who have completed their enlistment
obligation and 2) 17-23 year old men and women who enter under a reserve enlistment
contract. Reserve enlisted Marines must reside within 100 miles of their assigned drill
site because travel reimbursement would be required if they travel further than this
distance (Asch, 1986). The use of the newly authorized MBIG Stipend is applicable to
both groups with emphasis on the second. The objective is to entice new enlistees to
enter chronically short MOSs. The following research questions arise as a means of
accomplishing this goal:
• Are local area demographics supportive of established unit T/O
requirements?
• Are there manning problems for specific MOSs throughout the USMC
Reserve Forces?
• Are there RUCs with chronic shortages across all MOSs?
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The problem confronting M&RA for Reserve Affairs is identifying the type and
location of chronically short MOSs within the SMCR. The main purpose of this research
is to identify chronically short MOSs, the location of the units possessing those MOSs
and possible demographic factors affecting enlistment and retention in these MOSs. The
analysis to determine chronically short MOSs uses data resident in the Reserve Common
Component Personal Data System (RCCPDS) edit reports for each specific RUC held at
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and the HQMC T/O for each RUC. The
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RCCPDS is a historical database which includes detailed information on a selective
reserve member's current assignment, dependency data, initial entry information,
personal demographic information, and MGIB eligibility and participation information.
The HQMC unit T/O provides a detailed distribution by RUC of each unit's required
MOSs by number in each grade.
The second part of the analysis identifies factors causing chronically short MOSs
to be undermanned. The analysis considers data resident in the RCCPDS, Youth Attitude
Tracking Survey (YATS), Socioeconomic Status (SES), Recruit Market Information
System (RMIS), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and Census Bureau data. The YATS
database provides information on 16 to 24 year-old men and women and their propensity
to join the military. The SES database provides socioeconomic characteristics of
recruit's parents compared against all parents in the general population. The RMIS
database provides information on population demographics; annual contracts, accessions,
and attritions; prior service military available; and annual YATS information. BLS data
provides monthly employment levels by gender and geographic location and quarterly
wages paid. Census Bureau data provides general demographic information for a
particular geographic location. Finally, the analysis uses the demographic results to
determine whether the MGIB Stipend might bring the MOS of interest up to adequate
manning levels in the desired geographic location.
The thesis limits data for the analysis to enlisted Marines in the SMCR from fiscal
year 1995 to fiscal year 1998. The source for this information is RCCPDS. The study
also limits YATS, SES, RMIS, Census Bureau demographic data, and BLS Civilian
Employment Report data to those geographic locations of RUCs with identified
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chronically short MOSs. DMDC manages RCCPDS, YATS, SES, and RMIS data
sources.
In the next chapter, the thesis presents hiring and moonlighting employment
theories along with the results of previous studies on demographic influence on personnel
manning. Chapter three discusses the methodology used in the analysis. Chapter four
details the results of the study's analysis concerning MOS shortages and demographic
influences. Finally, the last chapter discusses demographic trends and possible target
populations for the MGIB Stipend.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Since 1800, the United States' general birth rate has decreased thereby placing the
armed forces is direct competition with civilian employers for qualified military available
youths (Boisvert & Sumner, 1990). Concurrently, the demand for workers with high
technical skills continues to grow thereby placing strains on a finite labor force. Verugo
and Berliant (1989) analyze Census Bureau data in an attempt to estimate the potential
pool of military recruits. They find that the qualified male population market is declining
dramatically and even outpaces the decline in the total youth population. They predict a
21 percent decline in the qualified male population market between 1985 and 1995
compared to a 12 percent general youth population decline that does occur.
This chapter begins by presenting the process for hiring new employees from the
viewpoint of the employer. The USMC is looking for new employees to fill the ranks of
the Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). The second section looks at the hiring
process from the employee's viewpoint. The current moonlighting model explains
motivational factors leading to an individual's decision to enlist into the SMCR as one to
take a second job. This section explores those motivational factors and their possible
effects on the individuals decision process. Finally, the chapter discusses the effect
demographic factors may have on the individual's decision to enlist and their role in
predicting reserve accession and retention.
A. EMPLOYER ACTIONS IN THE HIRING PROCESS
"Hiring practices should be consistent with organizational needs. Accurately
assessing staffing requirements is difficult yet important. Over- or under-hiring can have
serious implications for firm performance." (Larkin, 1995) The firm must view the
hiring of employees with the same financial and strategic perspective it views capital
investment and not as just a short-term expense. In fact, hiring an $80,000 per year
employee can translate into a $1 million investment for the firm over a ten-year period
(National Petroleum News, 1995). Therefore, the employer needs to prosecute the hiring
process in a clear, concise, and systematic way in order to minimize disruption to the firm
while maximizing the firm's productivity.




Establish human resource plans;
2. Specify time, cost, and staff requirements;
3. Analyze employment sources;
4. Determine and validate job requirements and employment standards.
Recruitment is a two-way process between the employer and employee who seek each
other out. Because of this "seeking-out" strategy, there must be a common
communication medium: the prospective employee must perceive a match between
himself and the firm, and he must want the job to such a degree that he is willing to apply
for the position. The firm is then responsible for creating an atmosphere that solicits the
desired response from perspective employees.
The firm must estimate the time, the money, and staff required to achieve the
desired hiring rate for the company. In order to determine these parameters, the firm
needs to identify one basic statistic: the number of leads required to generate a successful
hire in the designated time with the appropriate qualification level (Cascio, 1991). Hawk
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(1967) develops a "recruit yield pyramid" as a generic recruiting plan for firms to follow
when hiring new recruits for the firm. Cascio (1991) validates the formulation of the
pyramid which looks at the number of leads, invites, interviews, and offers needed to
generate one hire. In his example, 100 hires require 2400 leads. Both seek to provide an
encapsulation of the recruiting problem and to suggest areas requiring further exploration
before beginning the recruitment and hiring process.
The company's hiring process is further complicated by a number of external
factors. The firm must analyze the local external labor market and evaluate such items as
geographic factors, location, cost of living, competitors' demand for the local work force,
and local community support (Cascio, 1991). Once the firm determines that the local
community can support the desired hiring, it must analyze recruiting sources in order to
enhance effective recruitment planning. Hawk (1967) and Cascio (1991) identify three
types of required analysis: cost-per-hire, time lapse from employee identification to hire,
and source yield. The source yield, the most critical of the three, is the ratio of the
number of prospective employees generated from a given source to the number of hires
from that source. This evaluation is invaluable for determining how effective hiring time
is spent within the local labor market (Cascio, 1991). Both authors emphasize that the
information contained in the recruitment advertisement is of prime importance. A firm
following this hiring methodology can successfully compete in the local market place for
the employees it needs in order to attain its desired operational goals.
The USMC recruits for the SMCR by applying the principles listed above. The
USMC views members of the SMCR as full-time employees since they have the potential
for being called to active duty for an indefinite period of time at a moment's notice.
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Therefore, the USMC is concerned with putting the right recruit into the right MOS. To
that end, the USMC develops criteria for each MOS to ensure each member of a MOS
contains the raw skills and abilities to be successful.
The USMC uses the methodology of Marvin (1973) to place the right recruit into
the right MOS by using three inputs: "position profiles, prospects, and prospect profiles."
Position profiles state company performance expectations by experience for each
position. The USMC defines position profiles by use of the Military Occupational
Specialties Manual. The manual specifies the educational requirements for each MOS
and service schools required for assignment (HQMC MOS Manual, 1993).
Prospects are the recruits seeking employment with the firm (Marvin, 1993). The
USMC seeks prospects through a national recruiting command that uses predicted MOS
shortages and enlistment incentives such as the MGIB to place recruits into the desired
MOS. Finally, prospect profiles are biographical performance sketches of the employee
seeking the new position (Marvin, 1973). These profiles are ascertained by testing the
prospective recruit and maintaining the results in a personnel database. The recruit is
aware of performance expectations from the beginning, and the testing matches the right
recruit to the right MOS (Larkin, 1995; HQMC MOS Manual, 1993).
The USMC hires according to the theoretical procedures outlined by Marvin
(1973) and generally places the right recruit into the right MOS. However, the USMC
has trouble evaluating the local labor market in adherence to Cascio's work. Currently,
the USMC is unable to determine if the labor market can support the reserve unit's
manning requirements; in some cases it cannot, leading to chronically short MOSs at
some commands (Weis, undated; Weis, 1998).
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B. MOONLIGHTING MARKET THEORY
While the USMC views enlistees as full-time employees, the individual views a
decision to enlist in the SMCR as that of taking a second job or "moonlighting."
Reservists are often considered multiple job-holders or "moonlighters" because most of
them concurrently hold a primary job in the civilian labor market (O'Donohue, 1988).
The economic model that best describes the actions of the enlistees is the moonlighting
model put forth by Shishko and Rostker (1976).
1. The Shishko and Rostker Moonlighting Model
The Reserve Forces compete in the labor market with civilian firms in an attempt
to fill the reserve ranks. Since the typical reservist only works on average one weekend a
month and two weeks during the summer, the reservist usually must have a primary job
in the civilian market, and reserve participation is particularly appealing for the
individual looking for a second job. The Reserve Forces must offer pecuniary and non-
pecuniary compensation benefits to entice the reservist to forgo the leisure time he must
sacrifice in order to be a member of the organization (O'Donohue, 1988; Holzberger,
1986).
In the Shishko and Rostker model (1976), the moonlighter is an individual who
adjusts the number of hours he works in order to optimize the trade-off between leisure
and work hours. The moonlighter is locked into a primary job but seeks secondary
employment in order to achieve a higher income level or satisfy psychological needs by
becoming a member of the organization (O'Donohue, 1988). Shishko and Rostker
(1976) also identify four principle factors that entice an individual to moonlight or take a
secondary job. The four variables that affect the number of secondary job hours that an
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individual works are: 1) the number of primary job hours; 2) the primary job wage rate;
3) the secondary job wage rate; and 4) non-labor income. They test their model using
probit regression on civilian data from the University of Michigan Income Dynamics
Panel.
Shishko and Rostker (1976) find that one of the most important explanatory
variables in estimating the moonlighting supply function is the wage received on the
moonlighting job. As the secondary wage rate increases, the propensity to increase
moonlighting hours increases. Additionally, they discover that for every 10 percent
increase in the secondary job rate, the probability an individual will moonlight increases
by nine percent. The model also finds that increasing age reduces the propensity to
moonlight while increasing family size increases it.
Grissmer and Kirby (1985) identify a number of differences between the civilian
moonlighter and the reservist. Some of their findings are:
1. A reservist works on average four hours a week while the average civilian
moonlighter works 13 hours a week.
2. While reservists and moonlighters are paid about the same hourly rate,
reservists receive much less total income because of the reduced number of
hours they work.
3. Reservists legally obligate themselves for up to six years of service during
which they can be activated at any time. The civilian moonlighter has no
comparable obligation.
4. Reservists are eligible for non-pecuniary benefits such as the MGIB and
retirement that are not normally found in the civilian moonlighting job.
5. Reserve duty time and primary job time may directly conflict especially
during the annual two-week active duty training period.
6. Reserves receive non-pecuniary benefits such as specialized training, unit
associated camaraderie, and satisfaction from serving one's country that the
civilian moonlighter does not normally receive.
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Therefore, the Shishko and Rostker model may not fully explain moonlighting propensity
in joining the Reserve Forces but may require modification when dealing with the
reserves.
2. The Moonlighting Decision
Hamel (1967) does some early investigative work into primary motivational
factors on the decision to moonlight in the civilian job market. Using Division of Labor
Force Studies from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, he finds that among men who are the
heads of households, there is a direct and close relationship between multiple job holding
rates, the size of the household, and the primary job weekly earnings. Moonlighting
tendency decreases as primary job rates increase and increases as family unit size
increases. He also finds the majority of the moonlighters are men with the highest
number between the ages of 25 and 44. Moonlighting is least likely among younger
single men. Hamel (1967) finds the typical moonlighter to be:
...a highly motivated and energetic young married man with a growing
family, who works at two jobs or more primarily to provide additional
income for his family but also for a variety of other reasons: to try his
hand at working for himself; to keep busy; to obtain satisfaction; to
experiment with another line of work; or to supply skills that are in
demand in his community. The moonlighter aspires to a better living and
is willing to work hard to obtain his goal.
Perlman (1966) investigates motivation factors affecting a worker's decision to
moonlight. He finds the employee who decides to moonlight is not expected to work at a
significantly lower pay rate on the second job than on the primary job. Moonlighter
psychology describes multiple job-holders as workers who view consumption pressures
and aspirations as greatly exceeding the economic benefits of their primary job. He also
finds that an increase in the number of underemployed hours, fewer employment hours
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than he considers optimal, as wages rise leads to more moonlighting among affected
workers.
Amirault (1995, 1996 & 1997) reevaluates Hamel's findings using the 1995
Current Population Survey and finds some remarkable demographic shifts in the
moonlighting workforce. He primarily looks at educational attainment, earnings,
occupations, and primary job industries of employment to explain moonlighting rates.
He finds the tendency to moonlight increases with education at all levels with the
exception of those with professional degrees (physicians and lawyers). He also finds
moonlighting worker percentages decline only slightly as primary job earnings increase.
He theorizes this trend results because well-paid workers have primary jobs that permit
more work-hour flexibility or because they seek greater income levels. He also finds
workers holding primary jobs in the professional, technical, and service occupations are
the most likely to hold a secondary job.
Researchers apply the Shishko and Rostker model to the civilian labor market in
an attempt to determine additional factors that might affect the primary job-holder's
decision to moonlight. Krishman (1990) develops a self-selection model of
moonlighting. Her model explores a husband's decision to moonlight in conjunction
with his wife's decision to work. The model looks at 4,448 couples from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation, Wave 2. She eliminates households who are in the
armed forces, self-employed, or who work as unpaid family labor. Her results indicate
that increased participation by wives working, working longer hours and higher income
on the first job all deter moonlighting. A surprising result is that large amounts of
specific skills inherent in the worker also deter moonlighting but increase the worker's
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expected wages in the secondary job. She also shows that as family income increases the
probability to moonlight decreases. Finally, she finds general worker skills do not affect
wages on the job but do encourage moonlighting participation.
Allen (1998) investigates moonlighting behavior among unmarried men and
women, including unmarried parents. Using logit regression, his analysis considers 1,537
unmarried heads of households from the 1987 version of the University of Michigan
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. His findings suggest that a larger immediate and
extended family will lessen the probability that an unmarried individual will tend to
moonlight. For a single female parent, a greater number of small children under five
years of age reduce the probability of moonlighting. While still a factor for men, this
variable is not statistically significant. This same factor is statistically insignificant in
Krishman's (1990) study of married couples. As the number of children in this age group
increases, the parent has less time to moonlight. Allen also finds that unmarried women
in the youngest age groups are the most likely to moonlight which contrasts with
unmarried men, whose propensity to moonlight remains fairly constant over all age
groups. Finally, the effects of wealth and income exert no affect on the probability of an
individual to moonlight.
Tan (1991) explores the effects of demographic and macro-economic variables
and policy instruments on the supply of non-prior service (NPS) reserve personnel. He
predicts a greater likelihood towards reserve enlistment in local labor markets where the
civilian wage rate is low and reserve pay relatively high, and a lower likelihood in
markets where family income is high or long hours and overtime in the primary job
constrain moonlighting. He finds a lower propensity to enlist in the reserves in large
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urban labor markets where alternative civilian moonlighting opportunities are abundant.
In general, NPS enlistments in the reserves are higher when unemployment rates and the
size of the qualified military applicant youth population are high and lower in highly
urbanized local labor markets.
C. ACCESSION/RETENTION FACTORS
The prime recruiting market for military service consists of males age 17-21 who
are not institutionalized, are medically and morally qualified, are not currently serving in
the military, are not in college, score in the upper half of the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), and are high school graduates (Verdugo and Berliant, 1989).
The armed services use a number of recruiting incentives to entice this target population
to commit to a four to six year military service obligation. Stephens (1977) finds that
reservists value the non-pecuniary benefits of their jobs more highly than their civilian
counterparts, and group membership and liking for the military environment play
significant roles in their decision to join and remain in the reserves. These incentives
result from extensive research into demographic and personal factors within the
population that affect the accession and retention of recruits for both the active and
reserve forces. The factors include the effects of demographic, macro- and micro-
economic, and personal variables on the decision to enlist or remain in the military
establishment. A review of applicable studies follows.
1. The 1970s and 1980s
Mobley, Griffith and Hand (1977) conduct a study to explore positive factors that
affect an individual's decision to enlist. They find job training, educational benefits, peer
and parent influence, maturity and financial security are all factors leading to a recruit's
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positive decision to enlist. They also discover several factors that entice an individual not
to enlist. These factors are an individual's desire to finish his education, the sense of a
loss of freedom, pressure by the recruited to join and pressure by peers not to join.
Goldberg, Greenston, and Andrews (1984) conduct an exploratory study to
estimate Army enlistment supply of ten DOD one-digit occupational codes. These codes
closely correspond to the USMC use of MOS codes that indicate a particular job within
the armed services. They discover that military pay, unemployment and the number of
recruiters all have positive impact on the number of new recruits. They further discover
that bonuses and educational benefits are able to channel new enlistees into targeted
MOSs but do not increase the supply of enlistees. Finally, the authors find that a high
Black population in a geographical location has a negative effect on high-quality
enlistments. For each one-percent increase of Blacks in the total population, enlistments
decline by 9.5 percent.
Bock and Moore (1984) analyze Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) test performance of subjects against their background characteristics. This
study is of particular interest since ASVAB testing often determines a recruit's military
job assignment. They evaluate the specific characteristics age, sex, geographical
residence region, socio-cultural group membership, economic status, education level, and
mother's education. The analysis reveals that the individual's education and economic
status has a direct positive correlation to test results. Blacks score consistently below
Whites and Hispanics on all tests and at all grade levels and economic classes.
Additionally, Whites and non-poor groups perform much better in topics that require
school as the primary learning mechanism with the gap in performance increasing with
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the number of school years. Smaller differences in test performances remain constant
throughout all grade levels on topics that are less tied to formal learning but are more a
part of daily experience in and out of school.
Bock and Moore (1984) also look at test result differences by region. The authors
divide the country into four regions: Northeast, Southeast, Midwest and West. They
discover that Blacks and Whites in the Northeast perform slightly better than their
counterparts elsewhere in the country followed by the Midwest, West and Southeast. The
Northeast has higher scores in academic subjects while the West has higher scores in auto
and shop information and mechanical comprehension. Finally, Hispanics from the
Southeast and Midwest perform at the same levels as non-poor Whites in all subjects.
They also consider the mother's education level as an indication of a family's
contribution to the child's education. They find a strong and direct association with test
performance especially in areas dependent on language and instruction; a mother's
education has less impact on tests not strongly tied to formal education.
Brown (1984) explores the effects of pay, unemployment, educational benefits
and recruiting resources on active duty military enlistments in the Army from 1976 to
1982. His results demonstrate that a 10 percent increase in pay increases the supply of
potential enlistees by 10 percent. He also finds that a 10 percent increase in the
unemployment rate increases the number of high-quality enlistees by six percent. He
finds no significant correlation between educational benefits and recruiting resources and
their effect on enlistee availability.
Goldberg (1985) provides new estimates on the effect of unemployment on
enlisted retention. Generally, he finds that as unemployment increases, the first-term re-
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enlistment rate also increases. The study further investigates the effects of varying
unemployment on nine rating groups or MOSs and finds varying effects on the groups for
a particular unemployment rate; the unemployment rate affects the ability to recruit for a
specific MOS. He also finds that pay elasticities are three to five times larger than
unemployment elasticities indicating a decrease in the unemployment rate may be offset
by a much smaller increase in military pay for active duty members.
Pliske, Elig and Johnson (1986) conduct a new active duty recruit survey from
1982 to 1983 to study motivation patterns for enlisting. They are able to identify six
factor categories that account for the recruit's decision to enlist. The factors are:
1
.
Self improvement - self betterment, leadership and physical training;
2. Economic - money, skill training, desire for a better job;
3. Military service - patriotic duty, retirement and fringe benefits;
4. Time out - escape the current situation, join friends, family tradition;
5. Travel - see the world, leave home;
6. Education money - money for college or vocational/technical school.
They further find that high mental category recruits have a large positive factor score for
educational benefits so that programs such as the MGIB can be expected to have a higher
influence on their decision to enlist.
Antel, Hosek and Peterson (1987) study military enlistment and attrition. The
study's results show a negative relationship between an individual's academic ability,
educational finances (money for college) and employment opportunities and their
propensity to enlist. Education variables are more important for high school graduates.
Additionally, wage and job tenure variables relate negatively to enlistment propensity for
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graduates. The lower the tenure and the lower the wage, the more likely the individual is
to enlist.
O'Donohue (1988) examines factors influencing male, first-term enlisted SMCR
reservist's reenlistment decisions. He develops a non-prior service retention model using
logit regression to explain the reenlistment decision. He identifies several significant
demographic variables that account for the reenlistment decision. Those variables are:
1
.
Age - retention increases four percent with every year increase in age;
2. Family - the larger the service member's family, the less likely he is to
reenlist.
He also finds that high school graduates retain at a higher rate than non-high school
graduates and that those with some college are even more likely to reenlist. He also
discovers that sergeants and above retain at a higher rate, and those service members who
receive a bonus in their current rate also have higher retention. Finally, he finds that
reserve income has a positive relationship to retention and actually has a large impact.
Fithian (1988) also looks at male first-term enlistee retention in the reserves and
Air National Guard. Using logit regression, he investigates the relative importance of
various demographic, military experience and perceptual factors in the retention decision.
He finds a positive effect across all groups of the married demographic variable in
making a positive reenlistment decision. Education is not significant but tends to have a
negative effect on non-high school or GED graduates and the college educated who are
less likely to reenlist. The number of dependents tends to have a positive retention effect
(i.e. the more dependents the service member has the more likely he is to reenlist). Race
and ethnicity are not significant but Blacks are less likely to stay than Whites while other
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minorities demonstrate a higher propensity to reenlist than Whites. Finally, pecuniary
benefits are not significant and do not significantly contribute to the retention decision.
2. The 1990s
Fugita and Lakhani (1991) conduct a study that samples 7,525 reserve officers
and 29,783 reserve enlisted in order to estimate retention intentions. Their results find
that military earnings are positively related to retention. An increase of $1,000 in
earnings increases retention probability by 16 percent. Conversely, they also discover
that a $ 1 ,000 increase in civilian wages result in a decrease of one percent in probability
of reserve retention. They also find an individual's propensity to re-enlist increases with
an increase in his military seniority. Finally, they measure the effect of a spouse's
attitude on the re-enlistment decision. Using a five-point scale, they find an increase of
one-point on their survey results in a 26 percent increase in the likelihood of re-enlisting.
Queser and Adedeji (1991) analyze the re-enlistment decision of 27,000 active
duty Marines from fiscal year 1980 until fiscal year 1990. One of the areas they explore
is the effect of the selective re-enlistment bonus (SRB) multiplier; a monetary incentive
to re-enlist. They find SRBs exert a strong impact on the re-enlistment decision and for
each increase in the bonus award level, there is a six- percent increase in the re-enlistment
rate. In this study, the first term re-enlistment decision is very similar to the initial
enlistment decision. They also find a positive correlation between an increasing
unemployment rate and the positive decision to re-enlist.
Asch and Dertouzos (1994) analyze the relative cost effectiveness of enlistment
bonuses and educational benefits for inducing enlistment. They study several cohorts of
high quality recruits from the National Guard and Army Reserve between 1982 and 1984
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in order to determine the success of the enlistment bonus experiment. The results
indicate bonuses have a noticeable channeling effect towards targeted MOSs and are
successful in increasing the number re-enlistments. Educational benefits also display a
channeling effect but not to the same degree as bonuses do. The education bonus
increases enlistment contract completion but tends to reduce retention since those
receiving the bonus tend to continue their education. The analysis shows educational
benefits compare favorably with alternative recruiting resource options and increase high
quality enlistments.
Gee and Nelson (1995) study the difference in participation and usage behavior of
individuals using the MGIB and the Army College Fund (ACF). The study uses probit
regression linking the benefits offered to demographic factors, education level at time of
entry and the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) category. The study finds that
high school graduates participate in education programs at a much higher rate. Married
veterans, Blacks and veterans in AFQT category IUA are less likely to use the benefits
than unmarried veterans, Whites and veterans in AFQT categories I and II. Additionally,
as the enlistee's education level increases, ACF participation decreases. High school
graduates have the highest participation rates and use their educational benefits to obtain
an undergraduate education.
Moore, Griffis and Cavalluzzo (1996) develop a retention model for second-term
enlistment decisions by Navy enlisted. They find that all else being equal, women are
more likely to re-enlist or extend than men. The individual's marital status is significant
in the decision process. Married women are more likely to leave than married men, and
unmarried women are more likely to stay than their male counterparts. Additionally,
22
single parents are more likely to stay than married parents—possibly due to the need for
additional income. Minorities and individuals without a high school degree are less
likely to re-enlist. Additionally, the older reservist and the reservist in higher pay-grades
are more likely to re-enlist. Finally, the higher the individual's AFQT score the greater
the probability of re-enlistment.
D. SUMMARY
The recruitment process for the Reserve Forces operates in a unique environment.
The military views the prospective recruit as a full-time employee who may have to go
on active duty at any moment. The recruiting establishment approaches recruitment
along traditional lines and closely follows a process put forward by Cascio (1991).
Generally, the services are successful in meeting the personnel requirements set forth by
the Department of Defense.
The prospective recruit approaches the recruitment process from a completely
different direction. The perspective enlistee views the reserves as a part-time job.
Shishko's and Rostker's (1976) moonlighting model explains his enlistment decision.
While the model originally explains employee actions in the civilian labor market, work
by H.W. Tan in 1991 demonstrates its relevance to the military enlistment scenario.
Numerous studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s attempt to discover factors that
influence the enlistment and retention decision. Most of the studies investigate the
effects of demographic, macro- and micro-economic, and personal variables on the
decision to enlist or remain in the military establishment. After considering all of the




High proportion of qualified military available youth in the population;
2. Relatively low proportion of Blacks;
3. Relatively high levels of income and general affluence;
4. Low proportion of families with dual workers;
5. Large family size.
One drawback of all of the studies is their tendency to focus on reserve and active
duty accession and retention at the national level. Because of the unique requirement that
drilling reservists reside within 100 miles of their drilling unit, the current models may
not be completely applicable. Reserve enlistment operates not only in the national labor
market but also and more importantly in the local labor market (Daula and Smith, 1984).
Therefore, local demographic factors exert considerable affects on the number and type
of enlistments in the Reserve Forces. In order to be accurate, reserve supply studies need
to evaluate job markets at the lowest geographic level possible.
The literature indicates that community unemployment rates, population age,
income level, local labor market environment, community racial makeup, and education
level affect military enlistment rates at the national level. These factors might also
influence military enlistments at the local level but possibly not in the same priority nor
to the same degree of significance. These factors serve as a point of departure to answer
the question: Are local area demographics supportive of established unit T/O
requirements?
M&RA for Reserve Affairs has authorization to provide a stipend to the MGIB to
guide enlistments into chronically short MOSs. Unfortunately, the USMC does not know
which MOSs or geographic locations to target this new enlistment incentive. This
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research identifies the MOSs in the SMCR that are currently chronically short and also
identifies local and national demographic and economic variables affecting their manning




A. CHRONICALLY SHORT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES
1. Reserve Common Component Personal Data System
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) maintains the Reserve Common
Component Personal Data System (RCCPDS) database. The database contains personal
information on all current and former members of the US Reserve Forces and since 1975,
is the official source for Reserve Force strength data. The database contains 102 data
elements on each individual; indexing records by social security number (DMDC Profile,
1998). The RCCPDS contains detailed individual data including the service member's
current assignment, military advancement information, Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS) information, dependency data, initial entry information, personal demographic
information, and promotion and Montgomery GI Bill (MGEB) eligibility and usage
information.
2. Data Extraction
The US Marine Corps (USMC) DMDC liaison provides monthly personnel
transaction files from each active Reporting Unit Code (RUC) in the USMC Reserve
Force from October 1994 to September 1998. Each monthly file contains 54 data fields
on each active drilling Marine in the Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and
consists of approximately 30,000 Marines.
In determining chronically short MOSs within a RUC, the analysis uses three data
fields: 1) social security number for individual identification; 2) duty MOS that indicates
the Marine's MOS; and 3) pay grade, which indicates the Marine's rank. These files are
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analyzed by month to determine shortages within each RUC. Headquarters Marine Corps
(HQMC), Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) for Reserve Affairs provides a
database of currently active RUCs with each unit's associated Table of Organization
(T/O). The T/O specifies MOS authorization by rank for each RUCs manning level.
HQMC, Washington D.C., maintains all RUC T/Os and is the approving agency for T/O
changes.
3. Identifying Chronically Short MOSs
Whether a particular MOS is short depends on the number of Marines assigned to
the unit possessing that MOS and the Marines' ranks. After detailed discussions with
Major Weis, M&RA for Reserve Affairs, the analysis uses the following rule for
evaluating unit manning levels: a manning requirement for a particular MOS in any unit
is satisfied only by a Marine possessing the required MOS, school trained in the MOS,
and two ranks below or one rank above the grade requirement for the MOS. For example,
if the unit's T/O authorizes the MOS 0231, intelligence clerk, in the rank of sergeant, the
unit can fill the position with an individual with a rank between Lance Corporal and Staff
Sergeant with a MOS of 0231.
The study establishes a level of 70 percent as the minimum manning level;
therefore units failing to meet that level in a particular MOS are labeled as "short" in that
MOS for that month (Weiss, personal conversation, December 1998). Additionally, the
analysis requires MOSs to match exactly so that an individual in a related MOS can not
fill an MOS that is under-manned. Likewise, an individual with a particular MOS but
who falls outside of the established rank limits can not fill a billet requirement for that
MOS.
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The RCCPDS database, the actual on-hand strength report for the RUC, is
compared to the RUC's T/O to determine if the RUC is "short" in that MOS for that
month. After determining a RUC's manning level status each month for each MOS, the
study classifies the RUC as "chronically short" in that MOS if it fails to reach the
established manning level more than 70 percent of the time over the 48-month period.
Finally, the analysis computes the overall fill percentage of the RUC's authorized MOSs.
The number of MOSs that meet the 70 percent manning level for the 48 month period are
divided by the number of authorized MOSs in order to determine the unit's overall
personnel manning level. The analysis considers all 269 RUCs in the USMC Reserve
Forces in the determination of chronically short MOSs.
B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCE ANALYSIS
1. RUC Selection
In analyzing the influence of demographic and socioeconomic influences on MOS
manning levels at each RUC, the analysis initially considers all 269 RUCs. In
accordance with the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) regional breakdown of the
US into Northeast, South, West, and North-central regions, the RUCs are grouped by
region and then by state to include the District of Columbia (DC). States belonging to the
specific YATS regions are given in Table 1 .







The RUCs of a particular state are then collapsed into a single grouping to provide a
MOS fill rate for the state. For example, assume the state of Iowa contains two RUCs.
RUC A is authorized six MOSs and is chronically short in three while RUC B is
authorized eight MOSs and is chronically short in three. The state as a whole is then
authorized 14 MOSs and satisfactorily fills eight for a state MOS fill rate of 57.14
percent. The analysis uses these state MOS fill rates to explore demographic influences
on MOS manning levels by YATS regions.
2. Demographic and Socioeconomic Indicators
Demographic and socioeconomic data is obtained from the US Government
Census Bureau database. The DMDC provides regional estimates of youth attitudes
towards joining the military from the YATS database and estimates the number of
Qualified Military Applicants (QMA) between the ages of 17 to 21 years from the
Recruit Market Information System (RMIS) database for the geographic locations of
interest. The study investigates five broad areas of interest: 1) unemployment rates; 2)
population density; 3) educational and racial background of the local enlistment-eligible
population; 4) the local community's and enlistment-eligible population's attitude
towards military service; and 5) the community's overall economic situation.
Although unemployment data has been explored as an indicator to predict
enlistment supply, studies tend to focus on unemployment at the national level (Goldberg,
Greenston, & Andrews, 1984; Brown, 1984; Goldberg, 1985; Fugita & Lakhani, 1991).
The analysis uses state level unemployment figures while using the same approach in
gathering population density and racial background data for the state's enlistment eligible
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population. Of particular interest is the size and racial makeup of the prime enlistment
age group, 18 to 24 year olds.
The research only considers the male population since the USMC historically
recruits only three to five percent women for the reserve force (Weiss, personal
conversation, Dec 1998). The state population levels do not quite match up with the
RUC location. RUCs within 100 miles of the state's border can draw upon a portion of
the adjoining state's enlistment-eligible population. Additionally, RUCs in the larger
Western states can not draw on the entire state population, but the RUCs within a state
usually cover the entire state making the figure a reasonable estimate.
The analysis uses the number of veterans, active duty military, active duty
military dependents and Department of Defense civilian workers to try an get an
indication of the state's attitude towards military service. The enlistment-eligible
population's attitude towards military service will be more favorable where these groups
make up a larger proportion of the community's population (Pliske, Elig & Johnson,
1986). The YATS data is a direct indicator of the target population's propensity to
favorably consider military enlistment in the reserves.
DMDC compiles YATS data annually. The study estimates minority regional
data using minority national data and white regional and national data. DMDC does not
calculate regional minority YATS data because the sample sizes are too small to show
statistical significance (Shoenlin, personal communications, February 1999).
The economic makeup of the local community is captured by household size,
earnings per job, per capita income and disposable per capita income, and median
household income. According to the moonlighting theory, as income increases the
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positive propensity to join the Reserve Forces decreases. The United States Census
Bureau and Bureau of Labor and Statistics supplies all economic data.
3. Analysis
Previous research uses logistic regression to determine the effect demographic
and educational factors have on military enlistment supply (Bock & Moore, 1984;
Brown, 1984; O'Donohue, 1988; Fithian, 1988; Fugita & Lakhani, 1991; Tan, 1991;
Moore, Griffls & Cavalluzzo, 1996). The current analysis identifies regional factors that
might explain differences in RUC manning levels. The dependent variable is the MOS
fill rate for the state, and the goal is to find factors that account for the observed manning
levels.
In contrast to previous studies, the analysis starts with the entire data set in order
to identify factors influencing the unit's manning level. The initial step plots the various
variables of interest against the MOS percent fill rate in order to determine possible
predictors. After identifying possible demographic factors through graphical analysis, the
study uses exploratory data reduction techniques to reduce the field of demographic
factors.
Regression trees are used to discover structure within the data. Regression trees
are a non-parametric regression technique that can model either numerical or categorical
dependent and independent variables. The result is a regression tree consisting of
terminal nodes, "leaves", that contain groups of cases with similar values of the
independent variables and estimates the most likely value of the dependent variable
(Venables & Ripley, 1994).
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Regression trees begin with a parent node that contains the entire data set's
records. The deviance in that node determines how to partition the node. Let yy, j = 1 ,. . .,
n be the values of the dependent variable of a sample of size n, then the deviance for
regression trees with I nodes is:
Deviance = £ £ G7 j ~ f; )'
I y . e node ( ;
)
where node(i); i = 1,...,I is a partition of the integers l,...,n which defines the
membership of the nodes and yi is the average of the dependent variables in node(i). At
each step, a regression tree algorithm looks at every independent variable and all possible
binary splits within the independent variable; selects the variable and split which
produces the maximum reduction in deviance; and then splits the node into two
subordinate or "child" nodes. The two subordinate nodes' cumulative deviance will not
be larger than the parent's deviance. The procedure repeats itself until it is infeasible to
continue (Venables & Ripley, 1994). Because of the small data set, this study uses the
regression tree as a method to identify demographic and socioeconomic factors and to
determine significant independent variables that account for regional differences.
C. INTERNAL RUC PERSONNEL ANALYSIS
The study concludes by analyzing personnel within RUCs to determine if
differences exist between RUC populations in different geographic locations and between
YATS regions. The identification of personal differences leads to a prediction as to
whether the MGIB Stipend will be a viable enlistment incentive for increasing manning
levels in chronically short MOSs. For this stage of the analysis, the study selects all
weapons companies from the SMCR.
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The analysis uses data from the DMDC RCCPDS database. The database
contains personal data on all past and present members of the Reserve Forces. Each
personal record contains a number of data elements that reserve units report monthly to
DMDC. Data includes personal ethnic and educational information; MOS, length of
service, military test scores and type of service related information; and MGEB
information. The analysis uses the Pearson's chi-square test for independence to
determine if personnel in individual RUCs within a YATS region or the YATS regions
themselves are different in the demographic factors of interest.
34
IV. RESULTS
A. CHRONICALLY SHORT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES
ANALYSIS
1. Goals and Data Source
The initial portion of the analysis identifies the enlisted Military Occupational
Specialties (MOSs) in the US Marine Corps (USMC) Reserve Forces that are chronically
short over the last four years. Currently, Headquarters, USMC (USMC) Manpower and
Reserve Affairs (M&RA) for Reserve Affairs suspects certain enlisted MOSs are
chronically short but is not definitively aware which ones they are nor at which
geographic locations they are found (Weis, personal conversation, December 1998). The
analysis uses the Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) Reserve Common Component
Personal Data System (RCCPDS) databases from the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC).
The analysis uses four data fields from the monthly database files. These fields
are rank, social security number (SSN), the primary MOS and the Marine's assigned
Reporting Unit Code (RUC) number for every active drilling enlisted SMCR member.
The analysis uses the individual's SSN in order to avoid double-counting the Marine
during the initial database construction from DMDC. Additionally, the analysis uses the
Marine's rank, primary MOS and assigned RUC number in order to compare the unit's
on-hand strength against the unit's authorized Table of Organization (T/O). Appendix A
outlines all data fields the analysis uses.
Appendix B contains the functions developed for the analysis. The heart of the
chronically short MOS analysis lies in the ChronicCompare function. A RUC receives
credit for meeting the manning level requirements in a month if it achieves a 70 percent
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fill rate during that month. A required billet can only be filled by a Marine who is
school-trained in the required MOS and possesses a rank no more than one above nor less
than two below the rank designated in the unit's T/O. The analysis designates the MOS
for that RUC as chronically short if it fails to fill that MOS to 70 percent or more of its
requirement 70 percent of the time. HQMC, M&RA for Reserve Affairs supplies all
T/O's for the RUCs of interest.
2. Results
While the SMCR continually achieves personnel end-strength requirements, the
analysis finds the vast majority of the RUCs are well below a 50 percent fill rate for their
authorized MOSs. For example, if a RUC has a T/O authorization of eight MOSs it is
chronically short in six of them. Appendix C contains national and regional histograms
of RUC MOS fill rates in the SMCR. Due to its length, a report detailing the fill rate for
each MOS in each RUC over the last for years is omitted here but will be forwarded to
HQMC, M&RA for Reserve Affairs. Figure 1 depicts the fill rate for all MOSs across all
RUCs.
The majority of MOSs in the SMCR fall well below the 50 percent fill rate. The
analysis sees some variation from region to region that is apparent in Appendix C. Table
2 depicts fill rates for a small sample of the RUCs contained in Appendix D. The
analysis discovers shortages in every MOS throughout all of the regions. Table 3 depicts
four MOSs, the number of RUCs that rate the MOS, the MOS average fill rate over those
RUCs, and the fill rate standard deviation. These results are typical of most MOSs and a















Figure 1. USMCR Actual MOS Fill Rate
Table 2. Sample RUC Strength Results
RUC # Authorized # Fill % Fill Region
00409 26 8 30.77 4
00527 38 5 13.16 3
14174 8 3 37.5 2
14201 37 8 21.62 1
14334 17 8 47.06 3
14641 37 7 18.92 4
21404 24 7 29.17 1
22325 17 4 23.53 2
74489 16 6 37.5 3
Table 3. Sample MOS Fills
MOS TITLE #RUCs Mean Fill Std Dev
0151 Administrative clerk 181 70.93 31.63
0231 Intelligence clerk 62 31.28 33.99
0331 Rifleman 36 54.57 33.54
3051 Warehouse clerk 133 63.99 34.7
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Figure 2 depicts the RUC fill rate for Region 1. Appendix C contains the
histograms for the other regions. The fill rates for both RUC and MOS are not Normally
distributed and each region is decidedly different from the others. The graphs in
Appendix C depict the MOS chronic shortages throughout each region. Each region has
an average MOS fill for its RUCs well below 50 percent. All four regions have similar
mean fill rates and the standard deviations are surprisingly similar. In short, the overall
state of MOS manning levels within the USMC SMCR is consistently low. Table 4










Figure 2. Region 1 USMCR Actual RUC Fill Rate
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Table 4. Mean and Standard Deviation for Region MOS Fill Rates
RUC Fill
Region Mean Std Dev
1 (Northeast) 35.31 17.70
2(North Central) 33.69 18.42
3(South) 36.6 19.7
4(West) 35.22 19.15
B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCE ANALYSIS
1. Goals and Data Source
The second part of the analysis determines if there are any demographic factors
that account for the low MOS fill rates and if these factors are regional. The question of
interest to M&RA for Reserve Affairs is if there is a particular demographic factor or
group of factors that account for one region's MOS fill rate being different from
another's. This section of the study uses demographic data from a number of government
and private sources. The majority of the data came from the Bureau of Census, Federal
Reserve Banks, DMDC, and the Department of Agriculture.
The analysis uses the RUC's MOS fill rate as the response variable and
investigates several economic and population indicators. Economic factors include per
capita income, disposable per capita income, earnings per job, total disposable income,
local unemployment rate and household size. Population factors include local military
population size, local population racial make-up, number of available 18 to 24 year old





The analysis sorts the 269 RUCs within the SMCR by state location and
then groups the states into their respective regions. In the next step, the analysis
calculates the MOS fill rate for each state. The fill rate for each state results from totaling
the number of MOSs which each RUC within that state is authorized. The number of
filled MOSs, that is MOSs above the chronically short determination level discussed
previously, is calculated and then divided by the total number of authorized MOSs. This
procedure produces the state's overall MOS fill rate; a total of 47 data points since four
states have no RUCs at all. This technique prevents data from states with large numbers
of RUCs from overpowering data from those states that contain few RUCs.
The study collects demographic factors at the state level since RUCs can
recruit personnel up to 100 miles away and are generally located throughout the state.
Appendix F contains the state percentage MOS fill rate and demographic factors the
analysis uses. The analysis then plots the MOS fill rate against the demographic factors
in a series of scatter plots in an attempt to identify significant demographic factors.
Appendix G contains the most interesting scatter plots. Figure 3 depicts a
sample scatter plot for all 47 data points. The numbers within the scatter plot indicate the
region the state with that MOS fill rate and number of 1 8 to 24 year old males belongs to.





Figure 3. Percent MOSs Filled for each State vs. Number Males
Age 18 to 24 by Region
The analysis then looks at each region individually to determine if this
trend continues at the regional level. Figure 4 depicts a scatter plot for Region 1. In
Region 1 , the national trend seems to hold, and states with a lower population of 1 8 to 24
year old males have higher RUC MOS fill rates. Appendix G contains the scatter plots of

















Figure 4. Region 1 Percent MOSs Filled vs. Number Males Age 18 to 24
At the national level, the analysis discovers this same negative trend in
state MOS fill rates in a number of demographic factors. The demographic factors are
number of 18 to 24 year old males, state population size, the total number of qualified
military applicants (TQMA) within the state, number of White qualified military
applicants (WQMA) within the state, number of universities within the state, and the
number of state veterans.
Appendix G also contains the scatter plots for state MOS fill rates versus
Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) results. DMDC maintains the YATS database
that reports how likely high school youth will join the military. The reported percentages
are for USMC reserve affiliation propensity. The database actually reports this figure for
White males but the analysis derives the Black and Hispanic male propensity figures
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through interpolation. The YATS database reports Black and Hispanic propensity to join
at the national level and White male propensity to join at both the national and regional
level. Assuming Black and Hispanic male propensity to join at the regional level follow
the same trends as for White males, the analysis calculates the Black and Hispanic male
propensity to join through appropriate ratios. The results indicate that high YATS scores
do not translate into high MOS fill rates for the states.
The regional plots do not always coincide with the national demographic
trends and usually only one or two regions are consistent with the national trends.
Region 1 follows the national trend in the following demographic areas: number of 18 to
24 year old males, state population size, TQMA population, WQMA population, number
of universities and veteran population size. Region 2 does not follow any of the national
trends and displays a positive correlation only in the median income demographic factor.
In Region 2, as the state's median income increases, the state MOS fill rate also
increases.
Region 3 follows the national trend only in the state population size
demographic factor. Region 3 shows a weak positive correlation between population size
and MOS fill rate unlike Region l's strong correlation. Additionally, Region 3 also
displays a negative correlation with the median income demographic factor; as state
median income increases state MOS fill rates decrease. Finally, Region 4 weakly
correlates with the national trend in the following demographic factors: TQMA
population, WQMA population, state population size, veteran population size, and
number of universities within the state. As these demographic factors increase, Region
4's state MOS fill rates decrease slightly indicating a weak correlation between the two.
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b. Regression Tree Analysis
The analysis determines the important demographic factors through data
exploratory techniques in order to develop a regression tree to predict state MOS fill rates
by demographic factors. The analysis models state MOS fill rate by the following
demographic factors: 1) WQMA, 2) Black qualified military applicants (BQMA), 3)
Hispanic qualified military applicants (HQMA), 4) percent Black population
(PERBPOP), 5) percent Hispanic population, 6) percent White population, 7) White
Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (WYATS), 8) Black Youth Attitude Tracking Survey
(BYATS), 9) Hispanic Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (HYATS), 10) state
unemployment rate, 11) number of universities, 12) size of the 18 to 24 year old male
population, 13) state veteran population, and 14) earnings per job (EPJ). This analysis
uses the regression tree to identify demographic factors pertinent to a particular region. If
a majority of the states of a particular region end up in a leaf node as an explanation of
that state's MOS fill rate, then that demographic factor is said to be influential in that
region.
Figure 5 displays the regression tree. None of the regression tree's leaves
consist of states from just one region. The leaf that comes closest is the leaf with a MOS
fill rate of 57.46 percent. That leaf has four out of its five states from Region 1. The leaf
with a 47.07 percent MOS fill rate consists of states west of the Mississippi River but has
states from Regions 2, 3 and 4. Table 5 lists the leaf MOS fill rate, the demographic














Figure 5. Regression Tree Model ofMOS Fill Rates
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C. RUC PERSONNEL ANALYSIS
1. Goals and Data Source
The third part of the analysis investigates the personal differences between RUCs
in the Marines who man those RUCs. If the Marines of one RUC are significantly
different from those of another RUC then understanding those differences might provide
insight into targeting enlistment bonuses. After discussions with M&RA for Reserve
Affairs, eight RUCs are chosen for further analysis (Weiss, personal conversation,
December 1998). All of the RUCs are weapons companies located in eight different
states. The states represented are CA, LA, OH, EL, MO, MA, NY and WV. Region 1
contains two of the RUCs (RUCs 14217 and 14227), Region 2 has three RUCs (RUCs
14167, 14176, and 14186), Region 3 contains two RUCs (RUCs 14137 and 14237) and
Region 4 has one RUC (RUC 14127).
The database consists of 1,135 Marines and is a portion of the larger DMDC
database. The analysis investigates several service- and individual-related factors.
Service-related factors include Armed Forces Qualification Test categories (AFQTCAT)
and percentile (AFQTPER), training category (TRNCAT), years of service (YOS),
retirement points earned for the last year (RETPTS) and for the career (RETPTSC),
satisfactory training years (SATYRS) and MGIB status (MGIBSTAT). Personal factors
consist of marital status (MARITAL), current age (AGE), number of dependents
(DEPNS) and racial background (RACETHN). Appendix A contains a detailed
description of each factor.
The study uses graphical analysis and the Pearson's chi-squared test with the S-
Plus "chisq.test" function for independence between the various RUCs and between
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regions when practical. The null hypothesis for the test states that the RUCs' members
are similar in personal attributes. A significant p-value allows rejection of the null
hypothesis and leads to the conclusion that the RUCs are different in terms of personal
demographics. The analysis consolidates some factors' levels in order to run the test. In
order to keep the family-wise type I error less than .05, the significant p-value is set at .01
throughout the analysis since five tests are run on each data set.
2. Results
a. SATYRS Analysis
The variable SATYRS reports the number of satisfactory years the service
member has spent in the USMC SMCR. Since the units under consideration are all
similar, there should be no difference in the satisfactory years served by RUC personnel.
For the analysis, the range for SATYRS is collapsed into years zero, one, two, three, four,
five, six and seven or more years. The Pearson chi-square test returns an insignificant p-
value (.0137) when the RUC data set is tested as a whole which fails to reject the null
hypothesis indicating there are no differences between the RUCs in the area of
satisfactory years served by the RUCs' members. The tests on Regions 1, 2 and 3 return
insignificant p-values of .7084, .3913, and .0354 respectively.
The data is plotted using a Boxplot graph. Boxplots are convenient for
displaying information about the center or median of the data indicated by the white line.
The box in the graph is the spread or inter-quartile range of the data. Additionally, the
plot depicts outliers by "whiskers" above and below the inter-quartile range. Boxplots
are very useful in identifying symmetry within the data and between data sets (Hamilton,





The variable AFQTPER reports the individual's actual percentage score
on the AFQT upon his initial enlistment. Figure 7 is a Boxplot showing AFQTPER by
RUC. Additionally, Figure 7 shows a good degree of variation between the RUCs. The
analysis collapses AFQT scores into five bins of equal size. The ranges are 20-36
percent, 37-52 percent, 53-67 percent, 68-83 percent and 84-100 percent.
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Figure 7. AFQTPER Boxplot
Applying a chi-square test to the data produces a significant p-value
(.0001) and rejection of the null hypothesis for the whole group. The analysis uses the
same ranges for AFQTPER regional analysis. Applying the chi-square test to Region 1
results in an insignificant p-value (.8792) and failure to reject the null hypothesis. Region
2's chi-square reports a significant p-value (.0002) and rejection of the null hypothesis.
Region 3's chi-square test reports an insignificant p-value (.4822) and a failure to reject
the null hypothesis. Finally, the analysis performs a chi-square test on the combination of
Regions 1, 3 and 4. The test results in an insignificant p-value (.1361) thereby failing to a
reject the null hypothesis indicating homogeneous populations in those regions for the
AFQTPER variable.
c. AFQTCAT Analysis
The variable AFQTCAT reports the individual's AFQT category that the
AFQT score fell into. The DOD establishes the AFQT categories as follows: 1) I (93-99
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percentile), 2) II (65-92 percentile), 3) IIIA (50-64 percentile), 4) IIIB (31-49 percentile),
5) IV(A)-IV(C) (10-30 percentile) and 6) V (01-09 percentile). The military recruits in
mental categories IHA to I since those scoring lower do not generally possess the
academic ability to perform required training.
The plots indicate differences in the proportion of Marines within each
AFQT category between each region and each RUC. Of particular interest is RUC 14176
that shows the highest category of personnel in category HIB in contrast to the rest of the
RUCs. The RUC is located near Chicago, IL and may have a more difficult time
recruiting Marines in category I and II. Applying Pearson's chi-square test to the data of
RUCs as a group results in a significant p-value (0.0000) and a rejection of the null
hypothesis for the entire group. The analysis then applies Pearson's chi-square test to
each regional grouping of RUCs where applicable. Region 1 results in an insignificant p-
value (.8541) and a failure to reject the null hypothesis. Region 2's Pearson's chi-square
test reports a significant p-value (.0002) and a rejection of the null hypothesis. Region
3's test reports an insignificant p-value (.1221) and a failure to reject the null hypothesis.
The analysis then groups the regions that fail to show significance on the
regional test and tests these RUCs for possible differences. The test on Regions 1, 3, and
4 reports an insignificant p-value (.2600) and fails to reject the null hypothesis. Figures 8
and 9 graphically display AFQTCAT by region and by RUC.
d. AGE Analysis
The variable AGE reports the Marine's age of the population comprising
the RUC. The AGE variable is also reduced to two groups. The first group consists of
50
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
Figure 8. Regional AFQTCAT




individuals up to age 24 and the second group comprises individuals 24 years old and
older. A Pearson's chi-square test is run on the entire RUC data set and results in a
significant p-value (0.0000) and a rejection of the null hypothesis.
The same age groupings are carried into the regional analysis with Region
l's Pearson chi-square test reports an insignificant p-value (.1510) and a failure to reject
the null hypothesis. The Pearson chi-square test for Region 2 reports a significant p-
value (.0059) thereby allowing rejection of the null hypothesis. Region 3's Pearson's
chi-square test also reports a significant p-value (.0098) permitting rejection of the null
hypothesis.
A chi-square test on the combined data set of Regions 1 and 4 results in an
insignificant p-value (.2103) and a failure to reject the null hypothesis. Table 6 reports
the mean and standard deviation for AGE for each region and RUC. Additionally, Figure
10 is a Boxplot for the RUCs' AGE data.
Table 6. Mean and Standard Deviation ofAGE



















Figure 10. AGE Boxplot
e. DEPNS Analysis
The DEPNS variable reports the number of dependents each service
member supports. The data is divided into three groups: single, married with one
dependent, and married with two or more dependents. A Pearson's chi-square test run on
the entire RUC data set reports a significant p-value (.0073) and rejection of the null
hypothesis. The Pearson's chi-square test of Regions 1, 2, and 3 result in insignificant p-
values of .4383, .3452, and .2048 respectively. These regional results all fail to reject the
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Figure 12. RUC DEPNS
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/. MARITAL Analysis
The MARITAL categorical variable consists of the two categories
"single" and "married." A Pearson's chi-square test run on the entire RUC data set
reports a significant p-value (.0024) and allows rejection of the null hypothesis. The
same Pearson's chi-square test is applied to Regions 1, 2, and 3 individually and results
in insignificant p-values of .5139, .0719, and .4371 respectively. These regional results
therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis in each case. Figures 13 and 14 depict the

















Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
Figure 13. Regional MARITAL
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Figure 14. RUC MARITAL
g. RETPTS and RETPTSC Analysis
The variables RETPTS and RETPTSC report the retirement points the
drilling reservist received during the last fiscal year and has accumulated during his total
reserve service respectively. A large number of retirement points during the last fiscal
year indicate strong reserve affiliation. Additionally, a large number of career retirement
points indicate the individual has served in the SMCR for a number of years. Variation
appears in both variables at the regional and RUC level.
The data for RETPTS is consolidated into the following groupings: 0-58,
59-120, 121-182, and 183-245 points. A Pearson's chi-square test run on the entire RUC
RETPTS data set reports a significant p-value (.0001) allows rejection of the null
hypothesis. Region l's Pearson's chi-square test reports an insignificant p-value (.2378)
and fails to reject the null hypothesis. However, both Region 2's and Region 3's
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Pearson's chi-square test report significant p-values of .0048 and .0025 respectively and
rejection of the null hypothesis. Finally, a chi-square test reports an insignificant p-value
(.0740) for the combined Regions 1 and 4 and leads to a failure to reject the null
hypothesis.
A Pearson's chi-square test run on the complete RUC RETPTSC data set
reports an insignificant p-value (.0135), not allowing rejection of the null hypothesis.
Region l's and Region 2's Pearson chi-square test report insignificant p-values of .0992
and .4774 respectively and fails to reject the null hypothesis. Region 3's test also reports
an insignificant p-value of .0455. Table 7 summarizes the mean and standard deviations
for RETPTS and RETPTSC for both regions and individual RUCs. Figures 15 and 16
depict the Boxplots for both RETPTS and RETPTSC.
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14186 105.6 61.05 638.7 743
14217 88.47 62.00 471.1 476.2
14227 84.31 58.84 562.1 607.8
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Figure 16. RETPTSC Boxplot
h. YOS Analysis
The YOS variable is generated by subtracting the service member's pay
entry base date from the current date. It provides an indication of total military service
58
time to include active duty or prior reserve service time. The raw data is divided into
three cells: 0-3.68 years, 3.68-7.59 years, and more than 7.59 years.
A Pearson's chi-square test run on the complete data set results in a
significant p-value (.0010) and a rejection of the null hypothesis. Region l's and Region
2's chi-square test results in insignificant p-values of .1277 and .3088 respectively and
fails to reject the null hypothesis. However, Region 3's chi-square test does result in a
significant p-value (.0063) thereby rejecting the null hypothesis.
The analysis groups the regions that report an insignificant p-value on the
previous tests. The group of Regions 1, 2, and 4 report an insignificant p-value (.0162)
for the chi-square test statistic. The mean and standard deviation are calculated for each
region and RUC and are included in Table 8. Figure 17 depicts a Boxplot of the data.
Table 8. YOS Mean and Standard Deviation

















Figure 17. YOS Boxplot
i. TRNCAT Analysis
The variable TRNCAT is a snap shot of the service member's current
status within the unit. The variable takes on one of two values indicating the individual is
either fully qualified in his MOS or is awaiting training. A Pearson's chi-square test is
performed on the entire data set resulting in an insignificant p-value (.0137) and fails to
reject the null hypothesis.
The same test is then run on each regional data set. Region l's chi-square
test produces an insignificant p-value (.0265) and fails to reject the null hypothesis. The
chi-square tests for Region 2 and Region 3 also result in insignificant p-values of .0925
and .9762 thereby failing to reject the null hypothesis. Figures 18 and 19 depict the
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Figure 18. Regional TRNCAT
Figure 19. RUC TRNCAT
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j. RACETHN Analysis
The RACETHN variable provides a look at the racial makeup at the
regional and RUC levels. While the data fields in the original database include several
ethnic backgrounds, the analysis considers only two values, White and non-White. The
plots indicate large variations in racial makeup of units at both the regional and unit
levels. The analysis conducts a Pearson's chi-square test on the entire data set and
reports a significant p-value (0.0000), thereby rejecting the null hypothesis. The chi-
square test also finds significant p-values for each region. Regions 1 and 2 have p-values
of 0.0000 permitting rejection of the null hypothesis while Region 3 has a p-value of
.0300 not permitting rejection of the null hypothesis. The chi-square test on Regions 3
and 4 results in a significant p-value (0.0000) permitting rejection of the null hypothesis.
Figures 20 and 21 depict the regional and RUC RACETHN data values.
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
Figure 20. Regional RACETHN
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Figure 21. RUC RACETHN
k. MGIBSTAT Analysis
The MGIBSTAT variable reports the individual's current enrollment
status in the MGIB. While the data reports several fields, the analysis collapses the
variable into two values. The value indicates that either the reservist is qualified for the
benefit or is denied the benefit.
The Pearson's chi-square test reports a significant p-value (.0026)
resulting in rejection of the null hypothesis. The chi-square test is then applied to each
regional database. The chi-square tests for Regions 1 and 2 both fail to provide
significant p-values. Region 1 has a p-value of .1076 while Region 2 has a p-value of
.1016. In both cases, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis. Finally, Region 3's chi-
square test does return a significant p-value (.0002) thereby allowing rejection of the null
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hypothesis. Finally, the chi-square test on the data set comprising regions 1, 2 and 4
produces an insignificant test statistic of .0664 and fails to reject the null hypothesis.
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Figure 23. RUC MGIBSTAT
D. SUMMARY
The study's analysis begins with identifying chronically short MOSs within the
USMC SMCR establishment. The analysis finds shortages in all MOSs in every RUC
across all regions. The shortages are not confined to any particular MOS or family of
MOSs, and the same MOS chronically short in several geographical locations. Appendix
D summarizes the results of this part of the analysis.
The second part of the analysis identifies demographic factors that account for the
MOS fill rates throughout the country. Of particular interest are factors that may account
for fill rates within a region thereby identifying regional demographic factors. The
analysis looks at several demographic factors but fails to identify any factor that might
account for regional fill rates. By grouping RUCs by state and analyzing those same
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variables, differences appear and produce a regression tree that identifies factors
accounting for the state MOS fill rates. The variables EPJ, UNIV, UNEMP, HQMA,
WQMA and PERBPOP are the most significant variables in accounting for state MOS
fill rate differences.
Finally, the analysis determines if personnel assigned to a RUC have personal
attributes or characteristics different from other personnel in other RUCs. Using the
DMDC RCCPDS data, a number of personal factors are investigated through graphical
analysis and the Pearson's chi-square test. The analysis chooses a group of RUCs,
weapons companies, which possess roughly the same MOS makeup, number of
personnel, operational T/O and mission. The RUCs are spread throughout the United
States and represented all four regions in varying degrees. The analysis finds regional
and unit differences in several of the analyzed personal variables. The significant finding
is that the RUC population characteristics are not consistent nationally or regionally even
among similar units. Additionally, some of these differences appear to be regional in
nature while others tend to remain at the unit or RUC level.
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V. DISCUSSION
A. CHRONICALLY SHORT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES
ANALYSIS
The analysis of MOSs identifies chronically short Military Occupational
Specialties (MOSs) in every Reporting Unit Code (RUC) within the US Marine Corps
(USMC) Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). These shortages are not confined to
any particular MOS or any region. However, MOSs usually filled by senior enlisted
personnel tend to fill at a much higher rate regardless of MOS. It is the entry or junior
rank MOSs that seem to suffer the greatest shortfalls. Additionally, certain technical
MOSs have lower fill rates than the less technical MOSs.
The USMC SMCR attempts to alleviate some of these MOS fill rate problems by
establishing detachments in communities that have the greatest probability of filling those
MOSs (Weiss, personal conversation, December 1998). For example, a parent RUC in
Indiana whose mission is small electronic equipment repair might have a small
detachment in San Jose, California to try and tap into the local community's expertise.
Where this occurs, MOSs fill at a higher rate, but it is hypothesized that unit cohesion and
proficiency likely decline because of the geographic separation.
Another MOS fill rate trend is the tendency for units to fill Table of Organization
(T/O) MOS requirements with personnel with similar MOSs. The RUC's T/O might
authorize the unit only administration clerks with an MOS of 0151, yet the unit reports on
the monthly Reserve Common Component Personal Data System (RCCPDS) Marines
with the MOS of 0121 or 0131. The latter MOSs belong to the general 01XX
administrative family of MOSs, and it appears the unit is filling the required 0151 billet
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with a close substitute. However, the RCCPDS report does not indicate the Marine is
awaiting training. This trend occurs in the data throughout the four-year observation
period.
The unit can schedule a Marine filling a billet not in their MOS for the
appropriate school and then assign him the MOS upon school completion. However,
there is no way to determine if these Marines are scheduled to receive the necessary
schooling in order to acquire the billet MOS. The study observes this trend to fill
required billet MOSs with Marines possessing a close substitute MOS in several MOS
families throughout the analysis.
Another trend in the chronic MOS analysis is the large number of disassociated
MOSs in a particular unit. For example, one RUC, an infantry company, reports a
Marine on hand with the MOS of 7212, stinger gunner; however the unit's T/O does not
authorize a Marine with this aviation-ground MOS. The Marine is filling a billet and
probably obtaining on-the-job training for that billet; he most likely is not receiving
training in his primary MOS.
Because of the current highly politicized nature of SMCR RUC placement, the
identified MOS shortages will continue to exist. The SMCR attempts to resolve this
problem with the satellite detachment policy, apparently with little success. The best
alternative is to pursue a "grow your own" policy and recruit personnel for target MOSs
from the RUC's local community. Coupled with the satellite detachment policy when
required, the potential exists for significant reductions in the number of chronically short
MOSs within the USMC SMCR.
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B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCE ANALYSIS
1. Graphical Analysis Observations
This portion of the analysis investigates the relationship between MOS fill rates
and several demographic factors. The study collapses the individual RUC MOS fill rates
into 47 state MOS fill rates to include the District of Columbia. RUC density is much
larger in some states than in others and this technique seeks to place every state at an
equal level. The question the study seeks to answer is if demographic factors play any
role in MOS fill rates at the regional level.
Graphic interpretation indicates national trends in male—ages 18 to 24, population
size, Qualified Military Applicants (QMA) and White QMA (WQMA) population size,
veteran population size, number of universities within the state, and state median income.
In all but two of the demographic factors, state median income and number of
universities within the state, the relationship to state MOS fill rate is counter-intuitive.
Where these values are larger, RUC MOS fill rates are smaller. However, these trends
are strongly evident only in Region 1, only slightly evident in Region 4, and seemingly
absent in Regions 2 and 3.
Region 1, the Northeast, is the most urban region in the country with numerous
large population centers in the area. The large populations associate with low state MOS
fill rates as a result of these population centers. Here youth have numerous opportunities
for supplemental income jobs that do not require the contractual obligations that serving
in the Reserve Forces require. Additionally, youth in large metropolitan areas are less
likely to travel up to 100 miles for reserve duty when other local employment
opportunities exist nearby.
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Another factor at play may be the availability and reliability of public
transportation and the lack of privately-owned transportation for potential reservists from
these large metropolitan areas. Individuals in large cities do not view privately-owned
vehicles as a necessity and many do not own them. The very nature of reserve duty
almost precludes the use of public transportation since the reservist must bring his or her
military equipment to drill, and the unit itself will not provide transportation to and from
the unit for drilling reservists. The individual will not consider taking a job he can not
easily get to. Therefore, these population indicators do not translate into higher state
MOS fill rates in Region 1.
Regions 2 and 3 are more rural and display no trends concerning population
density factors. This rural population factor may also account for the extremely weak
correlation between Region 4 and the investigated population density demographic
factors. Region 2 and to a lesser extent Region 3 do show correlation with household
median income. States with higher median income have higher MOS fill rates in Region
2 while the opposite is true for Region 3.
Both Region 2's and Region 3's results support previous moonlighting theory
findings. Region 2's correlation supports Amirault's (1995, 1996 & 1997) work. He
finds higher-paying job workers more likely to moonlight. However, Region 3's results
support Hammel' s (1967) findings that as personal income increases the propensity to
moonlight decreases. Amirault's and Hammel's work are at the national level, and the
results indicate MOS fill rates are influenced to a much higher degree by regional and
state characteristics. Different RUCs appear to behave according to different
moonlighting economic models.
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Finally, Region 1 shows a negative correlation with the density of higher
education institutions. As the number of colleges increase within a state, the state MOS
fill rate declines. A prospective applicant probably views the two alternatives as
conflicting and chooses to do one or the other. Because of the contractual obligations of
reserve duty, his perceptions about reserve duty obligations are to some degree correct.
This factor does not influence state MOS fill rates in any other region.
2. Regression Tree Analysis
After failing to identify demographic factors to account for state MOS fill rates at
the regional level for regions other then Region 1 , the analysis looks at the state level to
try and identify possible influential factors. The regression tree analysis produces an
interesting set of demographic factors to account for state MOS fill rates.
The states with the highest MOS fill rates have fewer universities, lower
unemployment rates and higher earnings per job rates. Reservists in these states, which
come from Regions 1 and 4, view the decision to join the reserves as a supplemental
income decision much as Amirault (1995, 1996 & 1997) predicts. The second largest
MOS fill rate group, comprised of states from Regions 2, 3 and 4, mirrors the first with
the exception that these states have lower earnings per job rates in support of Hammers
(1967) theory. While the two theories initially appear to conflict with each other, it
appears local demographics play a much larger role than regional ones in accounting for
the individual's decision to enlist in the SMCR.
The results of the regression tree also conflict with the work of Holzberger
(1986). When considering the size of the Black population within a state, the analysis
finds a split between states possessing a higher Black population maintaining higher state
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MOS fill rates and states with a lower Black population percentage having lower MOS
fill rates. This demographic factor overshadows the WQMA demographic factor that
Holzberger finds to be a key predictor at the national level. In fact, states with higher
WQMA populations have lower MOS fill rates. The attributes that make an individual
desirable for enlistment into the SMCR also place him in the prime recruiting group for
active duty enlistment, the civilian job market, or higher education.
The regression tree does support Holzberger' s assertions on the importance of
relatively high levels of income and general affluence since states with higher earnings
per job have the highest MOS fill rates. Of interest however, is the absence of family
size from both the graphical and regression tree analysis. On average, family size is
homogeneous throughout the country and of no importance in determining the state MOS
fill rate. Finally, Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) data fails to predict regional
MOS fill rates. The results from the YATS survey do not translate into higher fill rates.
While possibly a good indicator for active duty accessions, it appears to provide little
information on future reserve accessions.
C. RUC PERSONNEL ANALYSIS
The analysis finally focuses on personal attributes of individuals within similar
RUCs. The analysis discovers wide variations between RUCs and regions in almost
every studied attribute. The study explores factors that might indicate a homogeneous
population at the regional level and identify what regions might be similar. The RUCs
fail to represent a homogeneous population across all of the explored factors. Region 4 is
not considered in the differences between RUCs within a region analysis because it only
contains one of the analyzed RUCs in this portion of the analysis. The analysis uses
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Region 4 in all of the chi-square tests performed on regions with homogeneous RUCs.
Table 9 summarizes the findings.
Table 9: RUC Personnel Analysis Results
Variable DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RUCs DIFFERENCE IN
REGIONS WITH
HOMOGENEOUS RUCS
REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION 3
SATYRS NO NO NO NO
AFQTPER NO YES NO NO
AFQTCAT NO YES NO NO
AGE NO YES YES NO
DEPNS NO NO NO YES
MARITAL NO NO NO YES
RETPTS NO YES YES NO
RETPTSC NO NO NO NO
YOS NO NO YES NO
TRNCAT NO NO NO NO
RACETHN YES YES NO YES
MGBSTAT NO NO YES NO
Except for racial makeup (RACETHN), Region 1 displays a fairly homogeneous
makeup of personnel within the region. Policy decisions should affect each RUC within
Region 1 similarly provided the policy is not designed to affect racial recruitment. In
fact, racial policy decisions appear to have local community implications throughout the
country. The local community environment will play a much larger role in influencing
prospective recruit behavior for this factor.
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Region 2 shows the most variability between RUCs. These RUCs display
variation within the Region in two important factors: AFQT percentile (AFQTPER) and
AFQT category (AFQTCAT). One RUC does have a lower AFQTCAT mix then the
other two. Its close proximity to a major metropolitan area, Chicago, probably explains
this trend. The individuals with better education have a larger number of job or
educational opportunities and are deciding not to join the SMCR. Again, depending on
the policy incentive, USMC planners should consider local demographics. From a career
standpoint the RUCs are a homogeneous mix, however during the last fiscal year some
variation does occur between RUCs. This variation might be an early indication of
significant manning level shifts in the future.
Region 3 displays the some variability between RUCs. Of particular interest are
the differences in age (AGE), yearly retirement points (RETPTS), and years of service
(YOS). All of these factors are indicators of career intentions. These attributes appear to
be even more localized possibly down to the local community level for this region. It
appears it is even more imperative to understand local population attitudes when
determining future policy decisions to influence the career reserve force.
Region 4's behavior is inferred by looking at the fifth column of Table 8. This
RUC is considered in every combination of those regions considered homogeneous in the
particular attribute. Region 4 is different from the rest of the country in the dependents
(DEPNS) and marital (MARITAL) factors. The large Hispanic and Asian populations in
several of the western states account for its racial difference with the rest of the regions.
This racial difference may translate into cultural differences that may in turn explain the
dependent and marital differences found with the rest of the country. Due to the vast area
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and diverse cultural backgrounds of the states in Region 4, policy decisions should take
local variations no higher than the state level into particular account before establishing
new recruitment incentives.
D. MGIB STIPEND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The study identifies numerous MOSs that are chronically short in every
geographical location throughout the US. While the USMC SMCR appears to be healthy
from a total numbers manning level, there are numerous problems in adequately filling
MOSs in the RUCs. As an incentive to change to or enlist in a chronically short MOS,
the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) Stipend should be beneficial. However, it does not
appear to be the perfect solution.
Headquarters, USMC (HQMC) Manpower & Reserve Affairs (M&RA) for
Reserve Affairs should target the MGIB Stipend no higher than the state level but usually
at the RUC level. Additionally, units that contain a higher percentage of Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) percentile and category I and II Marines are optimum targets
for the incentive. These contain the individuals who are more likely to desire this type of
enlistment or reenlistment incentive. Additionally, these Marines indicate the existence
of a local population that may be enticed by this incentive for reserve enlistment. M&RA
for Reserve Affairs should target the MGIB Stipend towards junior Marines and civilians
in communities where higher level education opportunities exist but local income and the
number of moonlighting opportunities are low.
It is doubtful the stipend will have a strong recruiting effect for the Reserve
Forces in large inner cities. The individuals in these labor pools are more likely to find
other job opportunities to supplement income or join the active military forces in order to
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escape their present economic condition. Region 2 seems to be the best candidate for the
MGIB Stipend targeted at the RUC level. The region displays significant RUC variation
in the percentage of AFQT Category I and II individuals as well as the AGE, RETPTS,
and RACETHN variables. The type of individual who scores high on the AFQT and is
career oriented might take advantage of the incentive and successfully transition into a
chronically short MOS and continue to serve for a number of years. Studies by Gee and
Nelson (1995) support this position.
Additionally, Headquarters, USMC M&RA for Reserve Affairs should develop
an alternative recruitment incentive to the MGIB Stipend. The proposed incentive will
not produce the desired numbers of recruits for the SMCR in every geographic location
where current chronically short MOSs exist. The opportunity for higher education may
not exist, or the individual might be looking to earn extra money in order to make ends
meet. This might be the situation for RUCs in Regions 3 and 4. The majority of the
states in both regions have larger rural populations, higher unemployment with fewer job
opportunities, fewer higher educational opportunities, and larger household size.
Therefore, a monetary enlistment incentive should result in higher reserve enlistment.
Work by Goldberg (1985), Krishman (1990) and Tan (1991) all support this position.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Further research in the area of demographic influences on retention and
enlistment is required to further investigate the trends identified in this study. The
identified personal trends are valid for reserve weapons companies. Of interest is if these
trends continue over all reserve RUCs regardless of mission, size and MOS and if they
are the result of local demographic factors. Additionally, what influences these factors
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have on the reserve enlistment or reenlistment decision, and how enlistment incentives
influence the individual's decision process are of interest.
Several areas, such as Southern California and the District of Columbia, contain
multiple reserve units or RUCs in close proximity to one another. While these units are
diverse with differing operational missions and T/O's, most of the RUCs T/O's do have
some similar MOS requirements that are filled at various levels. Further research in
developing optimization models that increase overall manning levels for particular MOSs
in a geographic location might reduce the number of chronically short MOSs in the area
thereby increasing overall force readiness.
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APPENDIX A. DMDC DATA FIELDS
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Must be a nine position numeric field in the submission file.
2. A range parameter test is performed to validate against the current (released monthly)
social security valid range guidelines.
3. Record may not be a duplicate within a single master file. (A single master file is one
of the 14 submitted master files - 7 components, Enlisted & Officer) - duplicates do exist
between these 14 submitted component master files as a consequence of delayed loss
reporting.
4. Should record fail test 1 above, the SSN is listed as a bad field on the monthly Edit
report and the record is rejected. Should record fail test 2 above, the SSN is listed on the
monthly Edit report as SSN Out of Range, but not rejected. Should a master file record
fail test 3 above, the SSN is listed as a bad field on the monthly edited report and the
record is rejected.
DATA ELEMENT HISTORY/VALIDITY: Data element is 100% valid for each







SBN CODING: 3 CHAR EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 13
FIELD EDITING: This field is checked to insure that the first position is an alpha
character and that the next two positions are numeric. Some allowances are made for
incorrect formats:
• If the first position is a zero (0) and the file being edited is an officer submission,
then the zero is converted to an 'O'.
• If the first position is not E or W or O, then it is converted to either E or O
depending upon what type of file is being edited (officer or enlisted).






- 1 5 WARRANT W0 1 -W05
20 OFFICER UNKNOWN
21-30 OFFICER O01-O10








SBN CODING: 8 CHAR EDIT CODING: 8 CHAR EDIT POSITIONS: 33-40
FIELD EDITING: If the 1st three positions equal WWW (Not Applicable) or ZZZ
(Unknown), then move spaces to output, otherwise pass field to output.
DATA ELEMENT HISTORY/VALIDITY:
THIS DATA ELEMENT IS THE SERVICE CODE FOR THE
MEMBER'S PRIMARY OCCUPATION. IT IS STORED IN ITS
ORIGINAL FORM WITH NO RECODING AND NO EDITING (SEE
POSITION 198 FOR VALIDITY). THIS ELEMENT IS CODED AS
FOLLOWS:
ARMY ENLISTED - MOS IS IN 1-3; SKILL LEVEL IS IN 4;
SQI IS IN 5; ASI IS IN 6-7 FOR USAR FILES 8808/LATER AND
ARNG FILES 8809/LATER
ARMY WARRANT OFFICER - MOS IS IN 1-4 WITH POSSIBLE
SKILL LEVEL IN POSITION 5
ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICER - SSI IS IN 1-3. THE
QUALITY IS GOOD FOR SELRES EXCEPT FOR USAR AGR. ASI IS
IN 4-5 BUT IS HIGHLY SUSPECT. SKILL OR LANGUAGE IS IN 6-7
BUT IS ALSO HIGHLY SUSPECT
NAVY ENLISTED - RATING IS IN 1-3; NEC IS IN 5-8. THERE
ARE CASES WHERE THESE DO NOT AGREE. THE DODOCC IS
GENERATED USING THE NEC WHERE POSSIBLE.
NAVY OFFICER - PRIOR TO 8705 NOBC IS IN 1-4;
BEGINNING IN FY87, THE DESIGNATOR IS IN 1-4 AND AQD IN 5-
7; BEGINNING IN 8805, MEDICAL PERSONNEL HAVE
DESIGNATOR IN 1-4 AND SUBSPECIALTY IN 5-8
MARINE ENLISTED - MOS IS IN 1-4 (NUMERIC)
MARINE OFFICER - MOS IS IN 1-4 (NUMERIC)
AIR FORCE ENLISTED - AFSC IS IN 2-6; 1 AND 7 MAY
CONTAIN ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIERS
AIR FORCE OFFICER - AFSC IS IN 2-5; 1 AND 6 MAY
CONTAIN ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIERS
COAST GUARD ENLISTED - RATING AND
QUALIFICATION CODE











EDIT CODING: 8 CHAR EDIT POSITIONS: 69-76
DoD INSTRUCTION: Enter UIC of Reserve unit to which Service member is assigned.
IfUIC where Service member is actually performing duty is different, then, also enter
data in record field 101. (Marine Corps to submit Reporting Unit Code (RUC) and
Monitored Command Code (MCC), Air Force to submit PAS Code, Army to submit 6
position UIC.) An IMA shall carry the UIC of the unit to which they are assigned. If not
applicable, set I = WWWWWWWW. If unknown, set I = ZZZZZZZZ
NOTE: USAR AGR have no UIC until FY86.
FIELD EDITING: If the 1st 5 positions of input are 00000,99999,WWWWW or
ZZZZZ then output is blank filled. If the 1st 6 positions of input are alpha or character
and component is either ARNG or USNR then move 1st 6 positions to output. If the 1 st 6
positions of input are alpha or character and component is USAR move entire input to
output. If the 1 st 5 positions of input are alpha or character and the component is
USMCR then move 1st 5 positions to output. If the 1st 8 positions of input are alpha or
character and component is USAFR or ANG then move input to output. If the 1 st 7
positions of input are alpha or character and component is USCGR move 'P' & 1st 7
positions to output.
DATA ELEMENT HISTORY/VALIDITY: The actual unit to which a member is
assigned. Especially in the case of the ARNG this may not be the unit he is physically












EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE BINARY EDIT POSITIONS: 22
CAUTION: On files earlier than 8610, a blank was coded as single (6).
FIELD EDITING: Submission values are converted to edited values according to the
following table:



















EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE BINARY EDIT POSITIONS: 23
DoD Instruction: The number of persons for whom the Service member provides
support. (Report only those eligible to be included on the DD Form 1 172, "Application
for Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege Card"). If not applicable, set I = 66.
If unknown, set I = 99.
NOTE: This is the actual number of dependents and does not include the member
(sponsor).
FIELD EDITING: Submission values are converted to edited values according to the
following table:
If value is 66, fill output with 99.
If value is 99, fill output with 99.
If value is not numeric or more than 20, fill output with 99.
If value is numeric and less than 1 1 , move input to output.





DATA ELEMENT: AGE POSITION 24
SBN CODING: N/A EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 24
FIELD EDITING: This field is generated and requires a valid Date of Birth and File
PARM card date. For transaction records a valid Date of Birth and transaction effective
date is required. After the transaction date is validated, it is checked with the PARM date
insuring that a valid transaction date cannot be in the past more than 10 years, or greater
than one year in the future. All dates used are converted to months. Date of Birth months
are subtracted form the PARM date (or transaction effective date) and multiplied by 12.









SBN CODING: N/A EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 26
CAUTION: This derived race/ethnic field has no statutory or regulatory base. It is
constructed for DMDC use only.
FIELD EDITING: This edited field is generated using values in the following
submission fields:
Race (position 58)
Ethnic group (position 59)





4 = NATIVE AMERICAN
5 = ASIAN
6 = OTHER
CAUTION: The values for edited ethnic codes are altered for this process and are listed
below:
If edited ethnic code is more than and less than 6, fill output with 3.
If edited ethnic code is more than 5 and less than 9, fill output with 4.
If edited ethnic code is more than 8 and less than 20, fill output with 5.
If edited ethnic code equals 22, fill output with 5.
If edited ethnic code equals 20 and race equals 0, fill output with 6.
The derived race/ethnic code is passed to the edited file based upon the following table:
RACE/ETHNIC CODE RACE ETHNIC
1 WHITE C X.Y.Z.BLANK
2 BLACK N X,Y,Z,BLANK
























EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 31
CAUTION: This field has changed over time.
CAUTION: Code 1 1 valid only for ARNG in Alaska & and only for Eskimo Scout
personnel.
FIELD EDITING: AFQT Score Group Code applies to enlisted personnel only. The
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Percentile Score is used to generate this field.
If the AFQT Score is numeric with a value range of 01-99, then move appropriate AFQT
Score Group Code to output, based on the table below.
If the AFQT Score is WW, move 1 1 to output.
If the AFQT Score is ZZ, move to output.






1 Category V 01-09
2 Category IVC 10-15
3 Category IVB 16-20
4 Category IVA 21-30
5 Category IV n.a.
6 Category IIIB 31-49
7 Category IIIA 50-64
8 Category III n.a.
9 Category II 65-92
10 Category I 93-99
11 Not applicable WW
Unknown ZZ
NOTE: Codes 1,5,8 are valid only prior to FY87; codes 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 are valid only
for FY87 and later. Coding of retiree records is not required.
DATA ELEMENT HISTORY/VALIDITY:
This field is generated as submission value is in the form of a percentile (01% to 99%)










EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 32
DoD INSTRUCTION: (Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Percentile Score
(Enlisted Only))
Report AFQT percentile score, or equivalent. If the score on a classification test is
available instead, convert classification test score to an AFQT percentile score and
provide a description of the conversion method. Convert percentile scores of 100 to 99.
If not applicable, set I = WW. If unknown, set I = ZZ.
FIELD EDITING: AFQT percentile applies to enlisted personnel only.
If the submission value is numeric with a value range of 1 -99, value is moved to output.
If the submission value is WW, move to output.
If the submission value is ZZ, move to output.
Otherwise, fill output with zero.
DATA ELEMENT HISTORY/VALIDITY:
Armed Forces Qualification Test score in percentile form (1% to 99%)
CAUTION: PRIOR TO APRIL 1992 THIS FIELD WAS 'ENLISTED TERM OF
ENLISTMENT'
This was coded in terms of Selected Reserve years as reported in submission
position
248, 249, or 250. If any of the fields were populated they were then used to fill this
field
1 -8 Years of SelRes Commitment
9 - indefinite contract











EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE BINARY EDIT POSITIONS: 21
FIELD EDITING: This field is generated from the following submission fields:
Number of years creditable for Reserve retirement (submission position 372-373).
Notification of eligibility for Military Retirement Pay Indicator (submission
position 385).
This edited field is constructed based upon the number of years creditable for Reserve
retirement multiplied by the value in position 385 (notification of eligibility). The
number of creditable years for retirement is a value from to 50. Records where
eligibility for retirement has been verified and letters of notification have been issued are
coded as a 1 in the submission record. Other records are coded as in the submission
record. An example of this calculation would be: a record with 22 creditable years for
retirement, with notification of eligibility, would be coded as 122; conversely a record
with 22 creditable years, without notification of eligibility, would be coded as 22.
Both of these submission fields must be numeric. The number of years creditable for
Reserve retirement must be a value between and 50 or the edited field is set to 98. If
notification of eligibility for Military Retirement Pay Indicator does not contain a 1
,
notification of eligibility is set to zero in the edited record.
DATA ELEMENT HISTORY/VALIDITY:
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SBN FIELD: N/A DATA ELEMENT: YEARS OF POSITION 85
SBN POSITION: MILITARY SERVICE
N/A
SBN CODING: EDIT CODING: 1 BYTE EDIT POSITIONS: 85
N/A BINARY
NOTE: This is not the same field as Year of Service on the Active Duty Files and
should not be used as such.
FIELD EDITING: This field is generated by subtracting PEBD from the file date on
master file records and the transaction effective date on transaction file records. This
represents the total years of service as differentiated from Years of Active Duty or Years
for Retirement. The following values are calculated and code as depicted below
00 Less than 1 Year of Service
1 -40 1 to 40 Years of Service
41 More than 40 Years of Service












EDIT CODING: 2 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 121-122
NOTE: Required only on Fiscal year end master files. Reporting is optional for AGR. 15
gratuitous points are awarded all Ready Reserve members. ARNG began reporting in
FY89.
FIELD EDITING: Submission values are converted to edited values according to the
following criterion:
-366 Valid input and is passed to edited field.
888 If 666 (Not Applicable) & SG,PJ,PK or Retired.
998 Non-numeric or invalid












EDIT CODING: 2 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 125-126
Note: Required only of Fiscal year end master files. Reporting is optional for AGR.
ARNG reported data on only a few states during FY88 which was their 1st year
reporting; the balance of the reserve components began reporting in 881 1. USAR's initial
reporting is believed not to be current.
FIELD EDITING: Submission values are converted to edited values according to the
following criterion:
-1 3000 Valid range and is passed to edited field
3 1 666 IF 66666 (Not Applicable) & SG,PJ,PK or Retired.
3 1 999 Greater than 1 3000












EDIT CODING: 2 BYTE
BINARY
EDIT POSITIONS: 125-126
Note: Required only of Fiscal year end master files. Reporting is optional for AGR.
ARNG reported data on only a few states during FY88 which was their 1st year
reporting; the balance of the reserve components began reporting in 881 1. USAR's initial
reporting is believed not to be current.
FIELD EDITING: Submission values are converted to edited values according to the
following criterion:
-13000 Valid range and is passed to edited field
3 1 666 IF 66666 (Not Applicable) & SG,PJ,PK or Retired.
31999 Greater than 13000











EDIT CODING: 1 CHAR EDIT POSITIONS: 236
DoD INSTRUCTION: Chapter 106 of reference (b) and DoD INSTRUCTION 1322.17
(references (p)).
If not applicable, set I = W. If unknown, set I = Z.
Field Editing: All values, other than those listed below, will be coded as Z in the edited
output.
If one of below values, move to edited output.
Code Description
A Ineligible - Service member has not executed a 6-year obligation in the
Selected Reserve after Sept 30, 1990. This code becomes not applicable for
members of the SELRES effective July 1, 1994. (Used for historical
purposes.)
B Ineligible - Service member in receipt of an ROTC scholarship.
C Ineligible - Service member has not executed a 6-year enlistment/re-
enlistment or extension of service in the Selected Reserve after June 30,
1985.
D Ineligible - Service member has executed a 6-year enlistment/re-enlistment
or extension of service in the SELRES after June 30, 1985, but has not
completed IADT as prescribed by the Secretary of the Military Department
(includes split training option).
E Ineligible - Service member did not receive a secondary school diploma (or
equivalency certificate) before completion of IADT (NPS) or before
execution of a 6-year enlistment/re-enlistment or extension of service in the
Selected Reserve. (PS).
F Eligible - meets the eligibility criteria under reference (b).
G Ineligible - correction of erroneous report of eligibility. No recoupment
required.
H Eligibility terminated - Service member has been determined to be an
unsatisfactory participant or performer.
I Eligibility terminated - Expiration of 1 year eligibility period.
J Eligibility terminated - Service member has completed a course of
instruction required for the award of a baccalaureate degree or equivalent
degree and has not executed a 6-year obligation in the SELRES after Sept
30, 1990. Not utilized for personnel who were accessed after Sept 30, 1990.
Code obsolete effective July 1 , 1 994.
K Eligibility terminated - Service member in receipt of an ROTC scholarship.
L Eligibility terminated - Service member died, Service member separated, or
transferred from the Selected Reserve.
M Eligibility suspended - Service member awaiting final determination of
unsatisfactory participation or performance.
N Eligibility suspended - Service member has been granted a period of
authorized non-availability (missionary), up to 3 years.




(all others) of up to one year.
Q Eligibility reinstated - Service member has reaffiliated with the Selected
Reserve following a period of authorized non-availability.
R Eligible - disability not the result of individual's willful misconduct.
S Ineligible - Eligibility terminated FTS and/or AGR who gained entitlement








#This function (ConvertRucTO) converts the reserve RUC T/0 to a data
# frame to be used in the ChronicComparev2 function to
# determine what MOSs in a particular RUC are short.
# ChronicRUCTO is a matrix generated from an Excel
1
# spreadsheet ahowing each RUC, the MOS, and the number
# of enlisted Marines by rank.
rue <- chronicRUCTO
dimnames (rue) <- list (NULL, ruc[l, ])
rue <- ruc[-l, ]
ruc.num <- rue [ , 5:11]
ruc.num <- matrix (as .numeric (rue .num) , ncol = 7)
dimnames (rue .num) <- list(NULL, dimnames (rue) [ [2] ] [5 : 11]
)
rue. name <- rue [ , c(l, 3)]
rucTO.df <- data. frame (Rue = I(ruc.name[, "RESRUC"]), PMOS =
I(ruc.name[, "BMOS"]), ruc.num)






# This function (ConvertChronicData) converts the individual chronic
data file into the
# proper format to be used in the chronic . compare function.
# The function takes a matrix created from a tab delimited Excell
# spread sheet and converts it into a table for use in the
chronic . compare function.
col. names <- dimnames (ChronicData) [ [2 ]
]
if (length (col .names) == ! any (col .names == "PMOS" )) {
dimnames (ChronicData) <- list(NULL, ChronicData [1 , ])
ChronicData <- ChronicData [-1
, ]
}
bads <- ChronicData [ , "GRADE"] < "01" | ChronicData [ , "GRADE"] >
"09"
i f ( any ( bads ) ) {
warning (" Some screwy ranks found and deleted in ruc!\n")
ChronicData <- ChronicData [! bads
, ]
}
chronic . eq. go <- ChronicData [ , 1] == ID
if (! any (chronic .eq. go) ) {
cat ( "Warning: no data found for rue ", ID, "\n")
return (NULL)
}
result <- table (ChronicData [chronic . eq. go, "PMOS"],
ChronicData [ chronic. eq. go, "GRADE"]) #
#
# If result doesn't have 9 columns, create a new item with 9 columns
# and put result into it in the proper way.
#
if (ncol (result) != 9) {
result2 <- matrix(0, nrow (result ) , 9)
dimnames (result2 ) <- list (dimnames (result) [ [1] ] , paste("0",
1:9, sep = " " )
)







function (tl, rue . tbl , rue, debug = F)
{
#
# ChronicComparev2 : compare the actual allocations (from
# table "tl") to the t/o allocations (in "rue"). Return
# one number per MOS describing how far away from the t/o
# this rue is for that MOS. This differs from Chronic . compare in
# that it it makes adjustments to the 0/H vector of strengths
# as it goes along and not the difference vector (d) between the 0/H
# and T/O vectors.
#
# Arguments: tl : table of actual. This has one MOS per row,
# one grade per column. E1-E3 may have separate columns, and
# we need to aggregate them.
# rue. tbl: t/o table. This also has one MOS per row,
# one grade per column except that E1-E3 have been combined.
# rue: rue of interest
#
# First make sure tl has 9 columns. If so, combine the 01, 02,
# and 03 columns
.
#




names. tl <- dimnames ( tl) [ [2 ]
]
if (any (names. tl == "01"))
tl.comb <- tl[, "01", drop = F]
else tl.comb <- matrix(rep (0 , nrow(tl) ) , ncol = 1)
if (any (names. tl == "02"))
tl.comb <- tl.comb + tl [ , "02", drop = F]
if (any (names. tl == "03")) tl.comb <- tl.comb + tl [ , "03", drop =
F] #
not .el .e2 .or .e3 <- names. tl != "01" & names. tl != "02" & names. tl
!= "03" #
if (sum(not .el .e2 .or .e3 ) != 0)
tl <- cbind( tl.comb, tl [ , not .el . e2 .or . e3 , drop = F]
)
dimnames (tl) [ [2] ] [1] <- "E13REQ"
dimnames (tl) [ [2] ] [-1] <- paste ("E", substring (dimnames (tl) [ [2] ] [-
1], 2, 2) ,
"REQ", sep = "") #
#
# Reduce the rue . table so that it refers only to this rue.
#
rue . tbl <- rue .tbl [rue .tbl [ , "Rue"] == rue, ] #
# Eliminate from tl any MOSs that don't appear in Rue.
#
good <- as . logical (match (dimnames (tl) [ [1] ] , rue . tbl [ , "PMOS"],
0)) #
tl <- tltgood, , drop = F] #
#
# At this stage, we have both tables where we want them. Set up
# the result, which gives the percentage short in each MOS. Make
# every entry 0% to start with -- this handles the MOSs in the
# rue table that don't show up in tl
.
#
result <- rep(0, nrow(ruc . tbl) ) #
names (result) <- rue . tbl [ , "PMOS"]
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tl.MOSs <- dimnames (tl) [ [1] ] #
compare. lines <- function (vl, v2 , debug = debug)
{
#
# Comparison function, vl is the "actual" and v2 is the t/o.
#
#
# If vl and v2 are not the same length, restrict vl to have the
# same names as those that appear in v2
.
#
if ( length (vl) != length (v2)) {
matchers <- as . logical (match (names (vl) , names (v2),
0))
vl <- vl [matchers]
}
# The next two lines are form the first chronic .compare
# d <- vl - v2
# if(all(d >= 0)) return(lOO) #
#




if (all(vl < v2)
)
return (100)
while (a < 8) {
d <- vl [a] - v2 [a]
if (debug)
cat ("Top: a is ", a, ", d is ", d, ", vl is ",
vl,
"\n")
if (d >= 0) {
vl[a] <- d
a <- a + 1
next
}
if (debug == T)
cat("vl is now ", vl , "\n")
if(d < && a > 2 ScSc vl[a - 2] > 0) {
z <- min ( - d, vl[a - 2])
d <- d + z
vl[a] <- d
vl[a - 2] <- vl[a - 2] - z
if (debug == T) {





if(d < && a > 1 ScSc vl[a - 1] > 0) {
z <- min ( - d, vl[a - 1])
d <- d + z
vl[a] <- d
vl[a - 1] <- vl[a - 1] - z
if (debug == T) {




}if(d < ScSc a < 7 && vl[a + 1] > 0) {
z <- min ( - d, vl[a + 1])
d <- d + z
vl[a] <- d
vl[a + 1] <- vl[a + 1] - z
if (debug == T) {











a <- a + 1
}
if (debug == T)
cat ("Final vl is ", vl , "\n")





# Handle case where Rue doesn't exist?
#
if (nrow(ruc . tbl) == 0) return (result) #
#
# Handle case where none of the remaining MOSs is in the rue.
#
if (length (tl. MOSs) == 0)
return (result)
for(i in 1 :nrow(ruc. tbl) ) {
if (length(ruc.tbl[i, "PMOS"]) == 0)
next
if (any (tl. MOSs == ruc.tbl[i, "PMOS"])) {
which <- (1 : length (tl. MOSs) ) [tl. MOSs == rue. tbl [i.
PMOS"]] #
rue . tbl [i
,
i f ( debug ) {




this. result <- compare . lines (tl [which, , drop = F] ,
c(-l, -2), drop = F] , debug = debug)













Combine ( ) : find the sum across all the matrices
of the form "c<i>eval" where i is in "which." This
presumes that each of these matrices will be of
the same size. The return value is one more matrix
# of that size giving the sum, across matrices, of
# the constituents.
#
first. time <- T
for(i in which) {
name <- paste ("c", i, "eval", sep = "")
if (! exists (name) ) {
warning (paste ( "No object named ", name,




cat ("Dealing with matrix ", name, "\n")
obj <- get (name)
if ( first . time) {
result <- obj > 70
res.ct <- matrix(l, nrow(result) , ncol(result]
)
res .ct [is .na (result) ] <-
remove ( " obj " , frame = sys . nframe ( )
)
first. time <- F
next
}
obj <- obj > 70
nas <- is.na(obj)
result [obj & !nas] <- result [obj !nas] #
# Now to get the percentage of time a particular MOS in a certain RUC
meets fill requirement.
#
res.ct [! nas] <- res.ct[!nas] + 1
remove (c ( "nas" , "obj"), frame = sys .nframe ()
)
}








# CreateShortRucList ( ) is a function that takes the MOS
# shortage matrix created by Combine ( ) . The function
# then manipulates the matrix in order to produce a
# list of short MOSs by RUCs
.
#
matrix <- t (shortMatrix)
matrix <- cbind(dimnames (matrix) [ [1] ] [row (matrix) ]
,
dimnames (matrix) [ [2] ] [col
(
matrix) ] , c (matrix)
)
dimnames (matrix) <- list (NULL, c("Ruc", "Mos", "Shortage"))
matrix <- matrix [matrix [ , "Shortage"] != "NA", ] #
short <- as .numeric (matrix [ , "Shortage"])
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APPENDIX D. RUC MOS FILL RATES
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RUC #MOS #FILL %FELL STATE
00048 13 3 23.08 TX
00049 16 0.00 GA
00051 16 3 18.75 PA
00053 13 1 7.69 CA
00055 17 9 52.94 MI
00407 11 1 9.09 IL
00408 28 10 35.71 IL
00409 26 8 30.77 CA
00510 20 6 30.00 CA
00512 34 14 41.18 GA
00526 14 7 50.00 PA
00527 38 5 13.16 TX
00540 21 10 47.62 MI
00541 20 9 45.00 WI
00542 23 4 17.39 WA
00983 19 6 31.58 CA
00985 20 10 50.00 MA
01124 37 1 2.70 TX
01129 13 10 76.92 LA
01130 26 6 23.08 TX
01131 37 3 8.11 PA
01134 27 10 37.04 CA
01136 40 7 17.50 TX
01146 29 13 44.83 IL
01148 37 11 29.73 CA
01149 41 7 17.07 CA
01151 25 10 40.00 FL
01180 14 3 21.43 PA
01199 16 2 12.50 MN
01208 22 8 36.36 CA
01209 7 3 42.86 CA
01233 33 7 21.21 NY
01234 35 5 14.29 TX
01236 14 3 21.43 TX
01283 42 11 26.19 CO
01308 15 7 46.67 VA
01309 19 6 31.58 VA





















































































































































































































































14661 8 2 25.00 PA
14662 12 5 41.67 PA
14663 8 3 37.50 DC
14664 8 4 50.00 GA
14701 30 13 43.33 TX
14702 4 0.00 TX
14703 8 3 37.50 MT
14704 16 8 50.00 NV
14705 8 3 37.50 NM
14706 4 1 25.00 TX
14707 8 4 50.00 AK
20094 10 1 10.00 CA
20095 10 4 40.00 NC
20096 14 4 28.57 NC
20097 14 0.00 CA
20124 41 6 14.63 CA
20161 39 9 23.08 NC
20192 19 9 47.37 CA
20193 19 10 52.63 DC
21337 16 0.00 MI
21401 31 12 38.71 NY
21403 16 9 56.25 KY
21404 24 7 29.17 NY
21405 16 6 37.50 FL
21441 39 9 23.08 CA
21442 9 7 77.78 CA
21443 17 6 35.29 WA
21444 17 8 47.06 ID
21626 26 17 65.38 CA
21627 13 10 76.92 FL
21628 26 10 38.46 FL
21681 28 4 14.29 NY
21683 11 3 27.27 NY
21684 30 0.00 NY
21685 16 3 18.75 NY
21831 41 13 31.71 FL
21832 7 4 57.14 MS
21833 16 10 62.50 FL





















































































71776 13 3 23.08 KY
71778 10 2 20.00 OH
73010 22 4 18.18 AL
73757 10 4 40.00 SC
74016 9 5 55.56 LA
74215 9 2 22.22 MA
74489 16 6 37.50 TX
74746 18 7 38.89 TX
74860 11 4 36.36 TX
75188 5 2 40.00 KS
75240 35 9 25.71 IN
75301 16 6 37.50 IL
75724 10 1 10.00 KS
75731 24 3 12.50 IN
77000 13 6 46.15 CA
77004 5 4 80.00 GA
77006 4 1 25.00 KS
77030 13 4 30.77 TX
77060 7 2 28.57 GA
77084 11 1 9.09 VA
77142 6 5 83.33 NV
77749 13 9 69.23 CA
77775 16 7 43.75 OR
96210 2 0.00 DC
96211 2 0.00 DC
96213 2 1 50.00 CA
96215 2 0.00 MA
96217 2 0.00 IL
96220 2 0.00 CA
96222 2 0.00 CA
96224 2 1 50.00 FL
96226 2 1 50.00 NY
120
APPENDIX E. SAMPLE MOS RUC FILL RATES
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Rue MOS Shortage State Rue MOS Shortage State
00048 0151 20.83 TX 14163 0151 72.92 MI
00053 0151 0.00 CA 14165 0151 79.17 MI
00055 0151 89.58 MI 14167 0151 100.00 OH
00408 0151 77.08 IL 14168 0151 100.00 MI
00512 0151 97.92 GA 14171 0151 95.83 IL
00527 0151 14.58 TX 14173 0151 37.50 IA
00540 0151 100.00 MI 14175 0151 4.17 WI
00985 0151 100.00 MA 14176 0151 100.00 IL
01129 0151 100.00 LA 14181 0151 100.00 MO
01134 0151 97.92 CA 14182 0151 64.58 TN
01136 0151 72.92 TX 14183 0151 83.33 TN
01146 0151 100.00 IL 14184 0151 2.08 IN
01148 0151 100.00 CA 14186 0151 100.00 MO
01149 0151 75.00 CA 14201 0151 22.92 MA
01151 0151 70.83 FL 14211 0151 75.00 MA
01208 0151 91.67 CA 14212 0151 50.00 ME
01209 0151 70.83 CA 14214 0151 79.17 CT
01233 0151 100.00 NY 14216 0151 85.42 NY
01234 0151 75.00 TX 14218 0151 81.25 NH
01283 0151 100.00 CO 14221 0151 35.42 NY
01321 0151 100.00 MD 14224 0151 77.08 NY
04091 0151 0.00 LA 14225 0151 100.00 DE
04147 0151 6.25 MD 14226 0151 91.67 PA
04156 0151 70.83 GA 14231 0151 95.83 OH
04160 0151 16.67 FL 14234 0151 100.00 OH
04169 0151 100.00 NY 14235 0151 81.25 PA
04249 0151 100.00 CO 14236 0151 95.83 OH
14003 0151 85.42 MN 14237 0151 87.50 WV
14004 0151 100.00 OH 14301 0151 100.00 TX
14005 0151 100.00 OH 14314 0151 100.00 CA
14008 0151 43.75 AL 14321 0151 66.67 TX
14011 0151 29.17 LA 14331 0151 60.42 PA
14021 0151 72.92 CA 14333 0151 41.67 NJ
14031 0151 60.42 CA 14334 0151 72.92 VA
14033 0151 89.58 MD 14335 0151 31.25 PA
14034 0151 87.50 UT 14341 0151 85.42 AL
14035 0151 68.75 VA 14401 0151 87.50 MD
14101 0151 66.67 CA 14403 0151 14.58 WV
122
14111 0151 100.00 TX 14404 0151 97.92 VA
14115 0151 100.00 TX 14551 0151 37.50 WA
14121 0151 100.00 CA 14552 0151 100.00 WA
14123 0151 83.33 CA 14554 0151 100.00 SC
14126 0151 95.83 CA 14601 0151 81.25 CA
14127 0151 100.00 CA 14604 0151 52.08 MS
14131 0151 89.58 LA 14613 0151 91.67 IA
14133 0151 85.42 LA 14614 0151 100.00 IL
14151 0151 14.58 KS 14641 0151 100.00 CA
14161 0151 35.42 MI 14652 0151 100.00 TX
14654 0151 77.08 FL 29071 0151 95.83 NC
14662 0151 100.00 PA 29073 0151 100.00 KS
14663 0151 79.17 DC 29075 0151 100.00 CA
14701 0151 100.00 TX 29076 0151 60.42 IL
14703 0151 62.50 MT 29078 0151 81.25 IN
14704 0151 68.75 NV 29084 0151 91.67 LA
14705 0151 64.58 NM 29085 0151 68.75 GA
14707 0151 81.25 AK 70694 0151 100.00 MA
20094 0151 14.58 CA 71007 0151 100.00 PA
20095 0151 0.00 NC 71776 0151 64.58 KY
20096 0151 64.58 NC 71778 0151 18.75 OH
20097 0151 0.00 CA 73010 0151 29.17 AL
20124 0151 10.42 CA 73757 0151 68.75 SC
20161 0151 27.08 NC 74016 0151 100.00 LA
20192 0151 100.00 CA 74215 0151 81.25 MA
20193 0151 95.83 DC 74489 0151 100.00 TX
21337 0151 0.00 MI 74746 0151 100.00 TX
21401 0151 100.00 NY 74860 0151 0.00 TX
21403 0151 39.58 KY 75240 0151 100.00 IN
21404 0151 37.50 NY 75301 0151 91.67 IL
21405 0151 52.08 FL 75731 0151 58.33 IN
21441 0151 100.00 CA 77000 0151 31.25 CA
21443 0151 83.33 WA 77004 0151 100.00 GA
21444 0151 97.92 ID 77006 0151 93.75 KS
21626 0151 93.75 CA 77030 0151 75.00 TX
21627 0151 87.50 FL 77060 0151 87.50 GA
21628 0151 62.50 FL 77084 0151 79.17 VA
21681 0151 50.00 NY 77142 0151 85.42 NV
21684 0151 0.00 NY 77749 0151 100.00 CA
21685 0151 85.42 NY 96210 0151 43.75 DC
123
21831 0151 0.00 FL
22321 0151 100.00 OR
22327 0151 100.00 AZ
22328 0151 39.58 OR
24246 0151 31.25 PA
28111 0151 97.92 NJ
28114 0151 100.00 CT
28115 0151 97.92 RI
28353 0151 43.75 HI
29052 0151 12.50 GA
29053 0151 81.25 NC
29054 0151 100.00 CA
29058 0151 100.00 NC
29059 0151 56.25 PR
29061 0151 22.92 VA
29062 0151 70.83 SC
29063 0151 54.17 AZ
29065 0151 100.00 NC
29066 0151 33.33 VA
96211 0151 41.67 DC
96213 0151 50.00 CA
00049 0151 0.00 GA
00051 0151 25.00 PA
124
Rue MOS Shortage State Rue MOS Shortage State
00048 0231 22.92 TX 14151 0231 83.33 KS
00053 0231 66.67 CA 14161 0231 14.58 MI
00055 0231 25.00 MI 14171 0231 2.08 IL
01124 0231 0.00 TX 14181 0231 12.50 MO
01130 0231 37.50 TX 14201 0231 54.17 MA
01131 0231 0.00 PA 14211 0231 0.00 MA
01134 0231 25.00 CA 14221 0231 37.50 NY
01151 0231 89.58 FL 14231 0231 25.00 OH
01208 0231 0.00 CA 14301 0231 18.75 TX
01233 0231 52.08 NY 14321 0231 16.67 TX
01234 0231 0.00 TX 14331 0231 91.67 PA
01283 0231 0.00 CO 14341 0231 12.50 AL
01309 0231 0.00 VA 14401 0231 0.00 MD
01321 0231 83.33 MD 14601 0231 16.67 CA
01764 0231 85.42 CA 14641 0231 4.17 CA
01767 0231 81.25 LA 14701 0231 29.17 TX
01772 0231 75.00 PA 14704 0231 100.00 NV
01773 0231 0.00 GA 20124 0231 18.75 CA
01774 0231 2.08 VA 20161 0231 62.50 NC
04091 0231 41.67 LA 20192 0231 0.00 CA
04147 0231 0.00 MD 20193 0231 100.00 DC
04171 0231 50.00 CA 21401 0231 0.00 NY
04714 0231 4.17 GA 21441 0231 60.42 CA
04780 0231 0.00 CA 21831 0231 100.00 FL
14008 0231 22.92 AL 22321 0231 77.08 OR
14011 0231 4.17 LA 28353 0231 8.33 HI
14031 0231 0.00 CA 29052 0231 0.00 GA
14101 0231 83.33 CA 29084 0231 0.00 LA
14111 0231 4.17 TX 73010 0231 14.58 AL
14121 0231 0.00 CA 00049 0231 0.00 GA
14131 0231 72.92 LA 00051 0231 50.00 PA
125
Rue MOS Shortage State
14114 0331 45.83 TX
14115 0331 54.17 TX
14116 0331 35.42 TX
14125 0331 33.33 CA
14126 0331 79.17 CA
14127 0331 70.83 CA
14133 0331 72.92 LA
14134 0331 45.83 TN
14136 0331 22.92 AR
14137 0331 91.67 LA
14138 0331 50.00 AL
14163 0331 10.42 MI
14165 0331 41.67 MI
14167 0331 77.08 OH
14168 0331 2.08 MI
14173 0331 0.00 IA
14174 0331 79.17 WI
14175 0331 22.92 WI
14176 0331 97.92 IL
14182 0331 0.00 TN
14183 0331 35.42 TN
14184 0331 0.00 IN
14186 0331 100.00 MO
14212 0331 33.33 ME
14214 0331 75.00 CT
14216 0331 68.75 NY
14217 0331 100.00 MA
14218 0331 35.42 NH
14224 0331 0.00 NY
14225 0331 95.83 DE
14226 0331 50.00 PA
14227 0331 100.00 NY
14234 0331 93.75 OH
14236 0331 64.58 OH
14237 0331 100.00 WV
77142 0331 79.17 NV
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Rue MOS Shortage State Rue MOS Shortage State
00048 3051 97.92 TX 14181 3051 100.00 MO
00053 3051 100.00 CA 14182 3051 79.17 TN
00407 3051 54.17 IL 14186 3051 25.00 MO
00510 3051 89.58 CA 14201 3051 12.50 MA
00512 3051 4.17 GA 14211 3051 0.00 MA
00526 3051 100.00 PA 14221 3051 87.50 NY
00527 3051 16.67 TX 14231 3051 66.67 OH
00540 3051 100.00 MI 14235 3051 87.50 PA
00541 3051 87.50 WI 14301 3051 12.50 TX
00542 3051 79.17 WA 14321 3051 43.75 TX
00983 3051 64.58 CA 14331 3051 62.50 PA
00985 3051 100.00 MA 14341 3051 72.92 AL
01129 3051 47.92 LA 14401 3051 89.58 MD
01146 3051 93.75 IL 14407 3051 47.92 MD
01149 3051 10.42 CA 14421 3051 22.92 WA
01180 3051 60.42 PA 14551 3051 100.00 WA
01199 3051 85.00 MN 14554 3051 97.92 SC
01208 3051 77.08 CA 14601 3051 22.92 CA
01283 3051 14.58 CO 14641 3051 100.00 CA
01309 3051 77.08 VA 14652 3051 14.58 TX
04091 3051 75.00 LA 14654 3051 100.00 FL
04171 3051 88.24 CA 14662 3051 100.00 PA
04714 3051 47.92 GA 14663 3051 10.42 DC
14005 3051 100.00 OH 14664 3051 100.00 GA
14011 3051 12.50 LA 14701 3051 100.00 TX
14021 3051 79.17 CA 14704 3051 39.58 NV
14031 3051 0.00 CA 20096 3051 14.58 NC
14035 3051 66.67 VA 20097 3051 0.00 CA
14101 3051 77.08 CA 20124 3051 85.42 CA
14111 3051 100.00 TX 20192 3051 100.00 CA
14114 3051 6.25 TX 20193 3051 39.58 DC
14121 3051 79.17 CA 21337 3051 31.25 MI
14123 3051 100.00 CA 21401 3051 77.08 NY
14127 3051 72.92 CA 21403 3051 100.00 KY
14131 3051 93.75 LA 21404 3051 75.00 NY
14151 3051 83.33 KS 21405 3051 100.00 FL
14161 3051 22.92 MI 21441 3051 2.08 CA
14167 3051 100.00 OH 21442 3051 39.58 CA
14171 3051 95.83 IL 21443 3051 100.00 WA
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21444 3051 100.00 ID 29063 3051 81.25 AZ
21626 3051 81.25 CA 29064 3051 0.00 DC
21627 3051 70.83 FL 29065 3051 58.33 NC
21628 3051 100.00 FL 29066 3051 85.42 VA
21681 3051 68.75 NY 29067 3051 100.00 CA
21683 3051 64.58 NY 29071 3051 100.00 NC
21685 3051 68.75 NY 29073 3051 100.00 KS
21831 3051 83.33 FL 29074 3051 100.00 NE
21833 3051 100.00 FL 71701 3051 87.50 DE
21834 3051 70.83 VA 71776 3051 97.92 KY
22321 3051 0.00 OR 73010 3051 50.00 AL
22322 3051 64.58 OR 73757 3051 47.92 SC
22324 3051 75.00 MI 74489 3051 70.83 TX
22325 3051 100.00 IN 74746 3051 91.67 TX
22327 3051 77.08 AZ 74860 3051 100.00 TX
23974 3051 50.00 CA 75240 3051 33.33 IN
28111 3051 85.42 NJ 75301 3051 58.33 IL
28114 3051 100.00 CT 75724 3051 0.00 KS
28115 3051 100.00 RI 77000 3051 0.00 CA
28353 3051 100.00 HI 77004 3051 70.83 GA
29052 3051 27.08 GA 77006 3051 16.67 KS
29053 3051 100.00 NC 77030 3051 85.42 TX
29054 3051 10.42 CA 77749 3051 45.83 CA
29057 3051 45.83 GA 77775 3051 97.92 OR
29058 3051 58.33 NC 00049 3051 0.00 GA
29059 3051 43.75 PR 00051 3051 0.00 PA
29061 3051 0.00 VA 01236 3051 0.00 TX
29062 3051 64.58 SC
128
APPENDIX F. STATE MOS FILL RATES
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STATE # MOS # FILL % FILL YATSREG
AK 8.00 4.00 50.00 4
AL 108.00 39.00 36.11 3
AR 8.00 4.00 50.00 3
AZ 29.00 14.00 48.28 4
CA 868.00 287.00 33.06 4
CO 63.00 18.00 28.57 4
CT 23.00 13.00 56.52 1
DC 46.00 19.00 41.30 1
DE 20.00 9.00 45.00 1
FL 167.00 76.00 45.51 3
GA 215.00 58.00 26.98 3
HI 17.00 5.00 29.41 4
IA 27.00 9.00 33.33 2
ID 17.00 8.00 47.06 4
IL 178.00 66.00 37.08 2
IN 104.00 21.00 20.19 2
KS 79.00 17.00 21.52 2
KY 29.00 12.00 41.38 2
LA 231.00 54.00 23.38 3
MA 127.00 40.00 31.50 1
MD 99.00 35.00 35.35 3
ME 9.00 4.00 44.44 1
MI 137.00 48.00 35.04 2
MN 16.00 7.00 43.75 2
MO 48.00 21.00 43.75 2
MS 25.00 9.00 36.00 3
MT 8.00 3.00 37.50 4
NC 155.00 53.00 34.19 3
NE 18.00 8.00 44.44 2
NH 9.00 6.00 66.67 1
NJ 48.00 21.00 43.75 1
NM 8.00 3.00 37.50 4
NV 22.00 13.00 59.09 4
NY 269.00 68.00 25.28 1
OH 130.00 43.00 33.08 2
OK 21.00 10.00 47.62 3
OR 76.00 25.00 32.89 4
PA 244.00 72.00 29.51 1
130
RI 15.00 9.00 60 .00 1
SC 45.00 23.00 51..11 3
TN 66.00 23.00 34..85 3
TX 491.00 133.00 27,.09 3
UT 20.00 9.00 45,.00 4
VA 182.00 66.00 36,.26 3
WA 110.00 37.00 33,.64 4
WI 37.00 16.00 43,.24 2
WV 24.00 12.00 50,.00 3
131
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APPENDIX G. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR SCATTER PLOTS
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